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This paper analyzes strategy-proof collective choice rules when individuals have
single-crossing preferences on a ﬁnite and ordered set of social alternatives. It shows
that a social choice rule is anonymous, unanimous and strategy-proof on a maximal
single-crossing domain if and only if it is an extended median rule with n − 1 ﬁxed
ballots located at the end points of the set of alternatives. As a by-product, the paper
also proves that strategy-proofness implies the tops-only property. And it oﬀers a
strategic foundation for the so called “single-crossing version” of the Median Voter
Theorem, by showing that the median ideal point can be implemented in dominant
strategies by a direct mechanism in which every individual reveals his true preferences.
JEL Codes: C72, D71, D78.
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1 Introduction
In social choice theory, a collective decision making process is usually represented by a social
choice rule. A social choice rule associates a unique alternative from the set of feasible alter-
natives to every possible list of preferences of the individuals in the society. A social choice
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1rule is said strategy-proof if no individual can ever beneﬁt from misrepresenting his true pref-
erences. A fundamental result in Social Choice, known as the Gibbard [18]-Satterthwaite [33]
Theorem, shows that, if the set of alternatives contains at least three possible outcomes and
individual preferences are not restricted in any particular way, then every strategy-proof
social choice rule is dictatorial. That is, there is an individual whose preferences always
dictate the ﬁnal choice regardless of other individuals’ preferences.
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem applies whenever every complete and transitive pref-
erence relation constitutes an admissible individual preference. In many economic and po-
litical applications, however, preferences satisfy additional properties. A case in point is the
single-peaked property. A set of preference relations is single-peaked if there is a linear order
of the alternatives such that every preference relation has a unique most preferred alternative
(or ideal point) over this ordering, and the preference for any other alternative monotonically
decreases by moving away from the ideal point. Single-peaked preferences naturally arise
in economics by maximizing a strictly quasi-concave utility function on a linear budget set.
They were ﬁrst proposed by Black [6] to assure the existence of a Condorcet winner, (i.e., an
alternative that beats every other alternative in a sequence of pair-wise majority contests).
And they represent a simple example of a restricted preference domain where the conclusion
of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem does not apply.
To be more speciﬁc, consider the family of eﬃcient extended median rules, which are
social choice rules that associate to each preference proﬁle the median alternative from a
list consisting of the n ideal points of the individuals and n − 1 other alternatives from the
feasible set of alternatives. An important case within this family is the well-known median
choice rule, which assigns the median ideal point to every proﬁle of individual preferences.
These rules are obviously non-dictatorial. In fact, they are anonymous, because the names
of the individuals play no role in taking social choices. They are also unanimous, in the
sense that they respect any unanimous consensus in the society about the most preferred
alternative. Furthermore, if individual preferences are single-peaked, then Moulin [25] has
shown that every member of this family is strategy-proof. Conversely, every anonymous,
unanimous and strategy-proof social choice rule on single-peaked preferences is an eﬃcient
extended median rule.
Although single-peakedness is an intuitive domain condition, there are interesting prob-
lems in political economy and public economics, such as majority voting over distortionary
tax rates, where individual preferences do not exhibit the single-peaked property. In some
of these cases, however, preferences do satisfy an alternative restriction called the single-
crossing property. This property appears for example in models of income taxation and
redistribution (Roberts [29], Meltzer and Richard [23]), local public goods and stratiﬁcation
(Westhoof [34], Epple et al. [13], Epple and Platt [14], Epple et al. [15], Calabrese et al.
2[8]), coalition formation (Demange [11], Kung [20]) and, more recently, in models to study
the selection of policies in the market for higher education (Epple et al. [16]), the citizen
candidate under uncertainty (Eguia [12]) and the choice of constitutional and voting rules
(Barber` a and Jackson [4]).
Unlike single-peakedness, the single-crossing property does not impose a priori any re-
striction on the shape of each individual preference relation. So, for example, it does not
exclude preferences which do not monotonically decrease on both sides of the ideal point.
That is the reason why it accommodates non-convexities that arise in some applications of
majority voting. If preferences are strict orderings, what the single-crossing property requires
is the existence of a linear order over the set of individual preferences with the property that,
for every pair of alternatives x and y, whenever two preference relations P ′ and P ′′ coincide in
ranking x above y, so do all preferences in between, so that the subset of preferences ranking
one alternative above the other all lie to one side of those who have the inverse ranking.1 Of
course, if indiﬀerence between alternatives is permitted, then the set of preference relations
for which x is indiﬀerent to y must be located between the subsets with a strict ordering of
these two alternatives.
As we show in Section 2.4, in several models, notably in models of redistribution ﬁnanced
by income taxation, the single-crossing property is implied by more fundamental assumptions
about preferences and technologies. For instance, it holds when individuals’ heterogeneity
is generated by a one-dimensional parameter θ, (which be interpreted as income, productiv-
ity, elasticity of substitution, discount factor, etc.), and the utility over social alternatives
exhibits increasing diﬀerences in θ (Milgron and Shannon [24]). In addition, under diﬀer-
entiability and some mild conditions on indiﬀerent curves, the single-crossing property is
also equivalent to the more familiar Spence-Mirrlees condition of incentive theory and infor-
mation economics, which requires that the marginal rate of substitution be increasing in θ
(Milgron and Shannon [24]).
The single-crossing property has in many cases a substantive interpretation. A working
example is the collective choice of an income tax rate. Suppose a moderately rich individual
prefers a high tax rate to another relatively smaller tax rate, so that he reveals a preference
for a greater redistribution of income. Then, the single-crossing property requires that a
relatively poorer individual, who receives a higher beneﬁt from redistribution, also prefers
the higher tax rate. Sometimes this is interpreted in the literature by saying that there is a
complementary between income and taxation, in the sense that lower incomes increase the
1When preferences are strict, it is also possible and convenient to derive a linear order over the set of
alternatives from the order of the preference relations, by deﬁning alternative x “smaller than” alternative y
if and only if the preference relations for which x is preferred to y lie on the left of those relations who rank
y above x (Saporiti and Tohm´ e [32]).
3incremental beneﬁt of greater tax rates. For another example, consider a strong army which
prefers a large territorial concession and a small probability of war to a small concession and
a high probability of war. Then, under single-crossing, a weaker army, with a lower expected
payoﬀ from war, should also prefer the large concession.
Like the single-peaked property, single-crossing also guarantees the existence of a Con-
dorcet winner and provides a simple characterization of it. The Condorcet winner is the
ideal point of the median agent, where the latter is the individual whose preference takes up
the median position over the ordering of individual preferences for which the single-crossing
property is satisﬁed.2 This result appeared ﬁrst in the seminal works of Roberts [29] and
Grandmont [19] and, more recently, in Rothstein [31], Gans and Smart [17] and Austen-
Smith and Banks [1]. It is referred to by Myerson [27] as the “single-crossing version” of the
Median Voter Theorem (MVT). Alternatively, due to the existence of a median individual
who is decisive for every nonempty subset of alternatives, it is termed in Rothstein [31] the
Representative Voter Theorem (RVT).
The problem with Representative Voter Theorem is that, unlike the MVT over single-
peaked preferences, whose non-cooperative foundation was provided by Moulin [25], the RVT
is based on the assumption that individuals honestly reveal their preferences. A natural
question is therefore how legitimate the Representative Voter Theorem is when preferences
are private information and individuals can report them insincerely. This question has
been recently addressed by Saporiti and Tohm´ e [32]. They showed that the single-crossing
property is suﬃcient to ensure the existence of social choice rules which are immune to any
individual and group misrepresentation of individual preferences. In particular, this is true
for the median choice rule.
Building on Saporiti and Tohm´ e [32], this paper characterizes the family of anonymous,
unanimous and strategy-proof social choice rules on a maximal single-crossing domain.3 This
family coincides with the class of positional dictatorships, which are extended median rules
with n − 1 ﬁxed ballots located at the end points of the set of feasible alternatives. They
include the median choice rule as a particular case.
Although the term “dictatorship” may initially provoke a negative impression about our
characterization, it is worth noting that the result is far from a negative one. A positional
dictatorship is a social choice rule which only considers the most preferred alternatives an-
nounced by the individuals, and always chooses one at a speciﬁed rank; e.g., the ﬁrst ideal
2Instead, under single-peakedness, the Condorcet winner is given by the median ideal point over the
ordering of the alternatives for which the single-peaked property holds.
3A set of preference relations with the single-crossing property is maximal if there does not exist another
set of preferences that contains the former set and satisﬁes the single-crossing property (see Deﬁnition 2 in
Section 2.3).
4point, the second, the median, etc. The preselected position is a “dictator”. However, in
diﬀerent proﬁles the ideal points of diﬀerent individuals can be located at that position.
Therefore, there is no a dictator as it is deﬁned in social choice theory.
In our model, positional dictatorships refer to the simple majority rule and other supra-
majorities. Hence, the main message coming out from the analysis is that the single-crossing
property is another simple domain restriction where majority voting works with “maximal”
incentive properties. The article explains the root of this good property of single-crossing
domains, and how far we can go in changing the majority rule.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, the notation
and the deﬁnitions. It also oﬀers two applications which provide intuitions about our abstract
setup. Section 3 contains the main results of the paper, included the characterization of
positional dictatorships and the relationship between strategy-proofness and the tops-only
property. As it happens in other cases, in our model every strategy-proof social choice rule
ignores all information about preferences except individuals’ most preferred alternatives.
The proof of this property constitutes a major step in establishing our characterization, and
we devote a considerable space to develop the formal argument that proves this result. For
expositional convenience, this is done in Appendix A. For the same reason, we relegate the
proof of the characterization of positional dictatorships to Appendix B. Section 4 analyzes
the robustness of our results to preference reports outside the single-crossing domain. Final
remarks appear in Section 5.
2 The model, notation and deﬁnitions
2.1 Individuals
Let N = {1,...,n} be a ﬁnite set of individuals. Except where otherwise noted, n ≥ 2.
2.2 Alternatives
Let X = {x,y,z,...} be a ﬁnite set of alternatives, with |X| > 2.4
2.3 Preferences
Let P be the set of all complete, transitive and antisymmetric binary relations on X. A
preference ordering over the elements of X is represented by an element P of P, with the
usual interpretation that for any pair x,y ∈ X, “xP y” denotes a strict preference for x
4For every set A, |A| stands for the cardinality of the set, and ¯ A for the complement of A.
5against y. Sometimes we write P = (xy z ...) to indicate that xP y, y P z, etc. For any
P ∈ P, and any Y ⊆ X, let τ|Y (P) = argmax
Y
(P). For simplicity, we denote τ(P) = τ|X(P).
Deﬁnition 1 (sc) A set of preferences SC ⊂ P exhibits the single-crossing property on
X if there is a linear order > of X and a linear order ≻ of SC such that ∀x,y ∈ X and
∀P,P ′ ∈ SC,
[y > x, P
′ ≻ P & yP x] ⇒ yP
′ x, SC1
and
[y > x, P
′ ≻ P & xP
′y] ⇒ xP y.5 SC2
To help the reader gain more insight about this property, Figure 1.a oﬀers a graphical
illustration of condition SC1. On the other hand, Figure 1.b exhibits a case where neither
SC1 nor SC2 are satisﬁed. In both graphs, arrows denote “preference direction”, so that





(a) Condition SC1 (b) Violation of SC1 & SC2
Figure 1: Illustration of Deﬁnition 1
In words, a set of preference relations SC on the set of alternatives X exhibits the single-
crossing property (or, for conciseness, SC is single-crossing) if there is a linear order > of X
and a linear order ≻ of SC such that whenever any preference relation P ∈ SC ranks any
alternative y above (respectively, below) any other alternative x and y > x, then so does
every other preference relation P ′ ∈ SC for which P ′ ≻ P (respectively, P ′ ≺ P).
As we will see in Section 2.4, in the applications where this domain restriction is used,
the structure of the models induces a natural order of X and of SC, and unequivocally
determines a unique set of single-crossing preferences. For example, in the paper by Barber` a
and Jackson [4], X = {1,...,n} is a set of voting rules, each of them represented by the
number of individuals needed to approve a proposal b against the status quo a. The elements
5For any x,y ∈ X, we write (1) x = y if and only if x > y and y > x; and (2) x ≥ y if and only if either
x = y or x > y. On the other hand, for any two distinct preferences P,P ′ ∈ SC, we say that P ≺ P ′ if and
only if ¬[P ≻ P ′].
6of X are ordered according with the usual order of the natural numbers. On the other hand,
the set of preferences with the single-crossing property is SC = {P(α) ∈ P : α ∈ (0,1)},
where α denotes the probability that an individual prefers b to a at the time of voting between
these alternatives, and for any two preference relations P(α′),P(α′′) ∈ SC, P(α′) ≻ P(α′′)
if and only if α′′ > α′. Thus, the order ≻ over SC is induced by the natural order of the
probabilities on the interval (0,1). A more detailed discussion about this model and how
the set of preferences SC is derived is postponed until Section 2.4.2.
The single-crossing property is closely related to other preference restrictions, such as
hierarchical adherence (Roberts [29]), intermediateness (Grandmont [19]), order-restriction
(Rothstein [30] and [31]), and unidimensional alignment (List [21]).6 In all these preference
domains the salient feature is the existence of a linear order of the preference relations with
the property that, for each pair of alternatives x and y, the relation x preferred to y (or the
reverse) partitions the line over which the preferences are ordered in two disjoint intervals.
If indiﬀerence between alternatives is permitted, then three of such intervals arise.
When individuals only diﬀer in their preferences, these domain restrictions can also be
deﬁned with respect to an ordering of the agents, instead of the preference relations (see, for
example, Rothstein [30] and [31], Gans and Smart [17] and Persson and Tabellini [28]). That
is, the existence of a linear order over the preference relations with the property described
above implies that “we can order individuals in such a way that for any pair of alternatives x
and y, the ﬁrst j(xy) ≥ 0 individuals in the ordering strictly prefer x to y (respectively, y to
x), the ﬁnal k(xy) ≥ 0 individuals in the ordering strictly prefer y to x (respectively, x to y),
and the middle group of individuals, if any, are indiﬀerent between the two”, (Austen-Smith
and Banks [1], p. 107).7
Scenarios where such strict ordering of individuals exists are quite common in political
economy. “For example, in redistributive politics policy makers are concerned with reallo-
cating resources from rich to poor people, subject to the constraint (typically) that such
redistributions do not reverse the rank-order of individuals’ wealth. So, while there does not
exist an obvious ordering of the alternative distributions of wealth, there does exist a natural
ordering of individuals and their preferences in terms of individual wealth”, (Austen-Smith
and Banks [1], p. 107).
From a technical perspective, the importance of single-crossing in political economy and
public economics is due to the fact that, like single-peakedness, this domain restriction
is suﬃcient to guarantee the existence of a Condorcet winner, especially in cases where the
6See also Barber` a and Moreno [5], who recently proposed a weaker condition, called top-monotonicity,
which encompasses single-crossing, order-restriction and single-peakedness.
7As the notation indicates, the “cut-oﬀs” agents j( ) and k( ) can depend on the pair of alternatives under
consideration.
7single-peaked property does not hold.8 However, apart from this, it is worth noting that both
conditions are totally independent, in the sense that neither property is logically implied by
the other. Examples 1 and 2 below illustrate this point.
Example 1 Consider the set of preference relations {P 1,P 2,P 3} of Table 1. Recall that, for
example, P 1 = (xy z) stands for xP 1 yP 1 z. Simple inspection shows that this set has the
single-crossing property on X = {x,y,z} with respect to z > y > x and P 3 ≻ P 2 ≻ P 1. On
the other hand, for every ordering of the alternatives, {P 1,P 2,P 3} violates the single-peaked
property, because every alternative is ranked bottom in one preference relation.
Example 2 Consider the set of preferences displayed in Table 2. This set has the single-
peaked property on X with respect to z > y > x > w. However, {P 1,P 2,P 3} violates
Deﬁnition 1, because for every ordering of the binary relations and for every ordering of the
alternatives, there exist a pair of preference relations in {P 1,P 2,P 3} and a pair of alternatives
in X such that SC1 and SC2 are both contradicted. (For example, if z > y > x > w, then
P 1 ≻ P 3 contradicts SC1 and SC2 for the pair {x,y}, while P 3 ≻ P 1 does so for {z,w}.)
Table 1: Single-crossing
P 1 = (xyz)
P 2 = (xz y)
P 3 = (z y x)
Table 2: Single-peakedness
P 1 = (xy z w)
P 2 = (z yxw)
P 3 = (y xwz)
Since the main purpose of this article is to characterize the family of strategy-proof social
choice rules on single-crossing domains, in what follow we restrict the analysis to the largest
or maximal sets of preference relations with the single-crossing property. These sets contain
the largest number of possible deviations. Therefore, they are the appropriate framework to
study incentive compatibility.
Deﬁnition 2 A set of preferences SC with the single-crossing property on X is maximal
if there does not exist SC
′ ⊂ P such that SC ⊂ SC
′ and SC
′ exhibits the single-crossing
property on X.
Example 3 To illustrate Deﬁnition 2, consider again Example 1. Notice that the set of
preference relations {P 1,P 2,P 3} is not the largest set that satisﬁes Deﬁnition 1 on X =
8A preference relation P ∈ P is single-peaked on X if there is a linear order > of X and an alternative
τ(P) ∈ X such that ∀x,y ∈ X, (i) τ(P) > y > x ⇒ τ(P)P y P x, and (ii) x > y > τ(P) ⇒ τ(P)P y P x.
A set of preference relations S ⊂ P exhibits the single-peaked property on X if there is a linear order >
of X such that every P ∈ S is single-peaked on X with respect to >.
8{x,y,z}, because there exists a preference P 4 = (z xy) such that {P 1,P 2,P 3,P 4} is single-
crossing with respect to z > y > x and P 3 ≻ P 4 ≻ P 2 ≻ P 1. On the other hand,
{P 1,P 2,P 3,P 4} is indeed maximal. However, it is not unique. If we consider the preference
relations P 5 = (y xz) and P 6 = (yz x), then the set {P 1,P 5,P 6,P 3} is also single-crossing
with respect to z > y > x, for P 3 ≻ P 6 ≻ P 5 ≻ P 1. Moreover, the union of {P 1,P 5,P 6,P 3}
and {P 1,P 2,P 3,P 4} covers all preferences on X.
At this point, it may be useful to compare the size of the set of all single-peaked prefer-
ences and the size of the maximal sets with the single-crossing property, for a given ordering
of X.9 For the former, it is well-known to be 2|X|−1. For single-crossing, the largest size
is |X|  
|X|−1
2 + 1, therefore much smaller. To see this, draw a line for each pair of distinct
alternatives in X. Observe that, under single-crossing, for each pair a,b ∈ X, the relation a
preferred to b (or the reverse), partitions the line associated with {a,b} in two disjoint in-
tervals: one interval where the preference relations for which a is preferred to b are ordered;
and the other where the relations with the opposite ranking of a and b are ordered (see
Figure 2 for the case where X = {x,y,z}). There are |X|  
|X|−1
2 such partitions. And the
projection of these partitions into a line forms at most |X|  
|X|−1
2 + 1 diﬀerent subintervals.
In each subinterval, the preference relation is entirely determined. Hence, the given number
|X|  
|X|−1
2 + 1 is an upper bound for the cardinality of the maximal sets of preferences with
the single-crossing property.10
y P x xP y
y P z
xP y P z xP z P y z P xP y z P y P x
xP z z P x
z P y
Figure 2: Maximal sets of single-crossing preferences
Fix now for the rest of the analysis a maximal set SC ⊂ P of preference relations with the
single-crossing property on X with respect to > and ≻. Suppose each individual i ∈ N is en-
dowed with a preference Pi ∈ SC. Let Pi be agent i’s private information. Assume everybody
knows the set SC; everybody knows that every agent has preferences on X out of SC; and so
9As we noted in Example 3, there may be several maximal sets of single-crossing preferences for a given
ordering of X. Instead, the set of all single-peaked preferences is unique once alternatives are ordered.
10I am grateful to Professor Moulin who has made this observation in personal correspondence.
9on. Denote by the n-fold Cartesian product SC
n the set of all single-crossing preference pro-
ﬁles. As usual, for any proﬁle P = (P1,...,Pn) ∈ SC
n, let P−i = (P1,...,Pi−1,Pi+1,...,Pn);
for each ˆ Pi ∈ SC, denote ( ˆ Pi,P−i) = (P1,...,Pi−1, ˆ Pi,Pi+1,...,Pn); and, for every set
S ⊆ N, let PS = (Pi)i∈S.
In the next section, we provide two applications which illustrate how our collective choice
model with single-crossing preferences can naturally arise in political economy. These ap-
plications have been selected to show that the single-crossing property can be easily derived
from more fundamental assumptions about preferences and technologies. Other examples of
this domain restriction can be found in Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita [3], Barber` a and
Moreno [5] and Persson and Tabellini [28], among others.
2.4 Applications
2.4.1 Income taxation
Consider a simpliﬁed version of the well-known model of redistribution ﬁnanced by a linear
income tax scheme, formulated by Roberts [29] and Meltzer and Richard [23]. In this version,
individual i’s preferences are represented by a utility function Ui(ci,li) = ci + V (li), where
ci denotes private consumption, li leisure time and V ( ) a continuous and concave function.
Let (1 − t)hi + T ≥ ci be individual i’s budget constraint, where t ∈ (0,1) is an income
tax rate, hi the individual labor supply, and T = (
P
i∈N thi)/n a lump-sum transfer. The
real wage is exogenous and normalized at 1. Assume each individual i is endowed with a
productivity θi ∈ Θ ⊆ R, and let 1 − θi ≥ li + hi be agent i’s eﬀective time constraint.
If we solve the maximization problem of each individual i ∈ N of type θi for a given
tax rate t ∈ (0,1) and substitute the optimal consumption, c∗
i(t,θi), and the optimal leisure
time, l∗







= H(t) + V [1 − H(t) − ¯ θ] − (1 − t)(θi − ¯ θ),
where H(t) = 1 − ¯ θ − V
−1
l (1 − t) is the average labor supply, Vl the ﬁrst derivative of V ( ),
and ¯ θ the mean productivity. Note that, for any two policies t′, t′′ ∈ (0,1), with t′ > t′′, the
diﬀerence W(t′,θ)−W(t′′,θ) = {H(t′)+V [1−H(t′)− ¯ θ]−(1−t′)(θ− ¯ θ)}−{H(t′′)+V [1−






Now, ﬁx a set with three diﬀerent tax rates X = {t1,t2,t3}, t1 > t2 > t3, and consider
the set of induced preferences over X, {P(θ) ∈ P : θ ∈ Θ}, where for all x,y ∈ X,
10xP(θ)y ⇔ W(x,θ) > W(y,θ). Deﬁne a linear order ≻ over {P(θ) ∈ P : θ ∈ Θ} in such
a way that for all θ′,θ′′ ∈ Θ, P(θ′) ≻ P(θ′′) ⇔ θ′ > θ′′. We claim that the set {P(θ) ∈
P : θ ∈ Θ} exhibits the single-crossing property with respect to ≻ and the order of X. On
the contrary, suppose that there exist x,y ∈ X and θ′,θ′′ ∈ Θ, θ′  = θ′′, such that y > x,
P(θ′) ≻ P(θ′′), y P(θ′′)x and xP(θ′)y. Note that yP(θ′′)x ⇒ W(y,θ′′) − W(x,θ′′) > 0;
and P(θ′) ≻ P(θ′′) ⇒ θ′ > θ′′. Hence, since W(y,θ) − W(x,θ) is strictly increasing in θ,
we have that W(y,θ′)−W(x,θ′) > 0, contradicting that by hypothesis xP(θ′)y. Therefore,
{P(θ) ∈ P : θ ∈ Θ} is single-crossing on X.
2.4.2 Choosing how to choose
Consider next Barber` a and Jackson’s [4] model on self-stable constitutions, where individuals
have induced preferences over diﬀerent voting rules (constitutions). In this model, a society
N = {1,...,n} chooses in period 1 the voting rule s ∈ {1,...,n}, which is used in period 2
to make a social choice between alternatives a and b. Suppose b is chosen if at least s votes
say b, and a is chosen otherwise. In period 1, individuals do not yet know their preferences
over a and b. Each agent i is characterized by a probability αi ∈ (0,1) that he will prefer b
to a at the time of the vote (i.e., in period 2). Each individual receives a payoﬀ of 1 if his
preferred alternative is chosen, and 0 otherwise.
Given the likelihood of diﬀerent patterns of support for a and b, agent i’s expected utility
W(s,αi) at period 1 under voting rule s is as follows. For any k ∈ {0,...,n − 1}, let Bi(k)




×j∈C αj ×ℓ ∈C (1 − αℓ).
The indirect utility associated with each voting rule s ∈ {1,...,n} and each probability








Lemma 2 in Barber` a and Jackson [4] shows that, for every s′ > s′′, the diﬀerence
W(s′,α) − W(s′′,α) is decreasing in α ∈ (0,1), capturing in this way the intuition that the
incremental beneﬁt of a lower quota raises as the probability of preferring b to a increases.
Like in the previous application, let {P(α) ∈ P : α ∈ (0,1)} be the set of induced
preferences over the voting rules {1,...,n}, where for every s′,s′′ ∈ {1,...,n}, s′ P(α)s′′
if and only if W(s′,α) > W(s′′,α). Deﬁne a linear order ≻ over {P(α) ∈ P : α ∈ (0,1)}
with the property that, for every α′,α′′ ∈ (0,1), P(α′) ≻ P(α′′) if and only if α′′ > α′.
Next we prove that the set of preference relations {P(α) ∈ P : α ∈ (0,1)} has the single-
crossing property on the set of voting rules with respect to the linear order ≻ and the
11natural order of {1,...,n}. On the contrary, suppose that there exist x,y ∈ {1,...,n} and
α′,α′′ ∈ (0,1), α′  = α′′, such that y > x, P(α′) ≻ P(α′′), y P(α′′)x and xP(α′)y. Note that
y P(α′′)x ⇒ W(y,α′′) − W(x,α′′) > 0; and P(α′) ≻ P(α′′) ⇒ α′′ > α′. Hence, since
W(y,α) − W(x,α) is decreasing in α, we have that W(y,α′) − W(x,α′) > 0, contradicting
that by hypothesis xP(α′)y. Thus, {P(α) ∈ P : α ∈ (0,1)} is single-crossing on {1,...,n}.
2.5 Aggregation process
The problem of the society described in Sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 is to make a social choice
from the set of alternatives X. Each individual is entitled to report a preference relation on
X from the set of admissible preferences SC, which is assumed to be commonly known. These
reports are intended to provide information about the proﬁle of true preferences, although
agents’ sincerity cannot be ensured.
A social choice rule is a single-valued mapping f : SC
n → X that associates to
each preference proﬁle P ∈ SC
n a unique outcome f(P) ∈ X. Denote by rf = {x ∈ X :
∃P ∈ SC
n such that f(P) = x} the range of f. Given a social choice rule f : SC
n →
X, a nonempty set S ⊆ N and a proﬁle P¯ S ∈ SC
|¯ S|, let O
f
S(P¯ S) = {x ∈ X : ∃PS ∈
SC
|S| such that f(PS,P¯ S) = x} be the option set of S, given that the remaining individuals
in ¯ S = N\S have reported P¯ S. If S = N, it is assumed that O
f
N( ) = rf.
We are interested in social choice rules that satisfy the following properties on SC
n. The
main one is that individuals never have incentives to misrepresent their preferences.
Deﬁnition 3 (sp) A social choice rule f : SC
n → X is strategy-proof if ∀i ∈ N and
∀(Pi,P−i) ∈ SC
n, there is no ˆ Pi ∈ SC such that f( ˆ Pi,P−i)Pi f(Pi,P−i).
There are two interpretations of Deﬁnition 3. According with the ﬁrst interpretation, a
social choice rule f on SC
n is strategy-proof if for any individual i ∈ N, any possible prefer-
ence Pi ∈ SC for i and any collection of preferences P−i ∈ SC
n−1 that the other individuals
could report, individual i is not better oﬀ, according to Pi, by reporting a preference ˆ Pi ∈ SC
diﬀerent from Pi.
Alternatively, following Austen-Smith and Banks [2], p. 21., we could also say that
a social choice rule f on SC
n is strategy-proof if for every i ∈ N, regardless of the true
preferences P−i ∈ SC
n−1 of all individuals other than i, agent i can do no better than report
his true preferences Pi ∈ SC, no matter which Pi individual i is endowed with. In this
second view, a strategy-proof social choice rule provides no opportunities for any individual
to proﬁtably change the social outcome by misrepresenting the true preferences, given that
all others report the truth.
Independently of the interpretation given to Deﬁnition 3, if a social choice rule f is not
strategy-proof, then there must exist one agent, say i ∈ N, who can be strictly better oﬀ in
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n, by announcing a preference ˆ Pi ∈ SC diﬀerent from
his true ordering Pi. In that case, we say f is manipulable by i ∈ N at (Pi,P−i) ∈ SC
n
via ˆ Pi ∈ SC.
To study the possibility of group deviations, it is also possible to deﬁne the concept of
group strategy-proofness, which can be obviously interpreted in a similar way than strategy-
proofness, except for the fact that it is a coalition of individuals who deviate from the true
preferences.
Deﬁnition 4 (gsp) A social choice rule f : SC
n → X is group strategy-proof if ∀S ⊆ N
and ∀(PS,P¯ S) ∈ SC
n, there is no ˆ PS ∈ SC
|S| such that ∀i ∈ S, f(ˆ PS,P¯ S)Pi f(PS,P¯ S).
Another property that we may seek in a social choice rule is unanimity. This property
ensures that, if all agents have the same most preferred alternative, then that alternative is
socially selected.
Deﬁnition 5 (un) A social choice rule f : SC
n → X is unanimous if ∀x ∈ X and
∀P ∈ SC
n such that τ(Pi) = x ∀i ∈ N, f(P) = x.
A proﬁle P ∈ SC
n is a permutation of another proﬁle ˆ P ∈ SC
n if there is a one-to-one
function σ : N → N such that for every individual i ∈ N, Pi is identical to ˆ Pσ(i). That
is, P is a permutation of ˆ P if the lists of preferences under P and ˆ P are identical up to a
renaming of agents.
Deﬁnition 6 (an) A social choice rule f : SC
n → X is anonymous if f(P) = f(ˆ P) for
every permutation P of ˆ P ∈ SC
n.
In words, a social choice rule is anonymous if the names of the individuals holding par-
ticular preferences are immaterial in deriving social choices.
One last property that a social choice rule may satisfy is the tops-only property. We say
that f is tops-only if for any admissible preference proﬁle, the social choice is exclusively
determined by individuals’ most preferred alternatives on the range of the social choice rule.
Deﬁnition 7 (to) A social choice rule f : SC
n → X is tops-only if ∀P, ˆ P ∈ SC
n such
that τ|rf(Pi) = τ|rf( ˆ Pi) ∀i ∈ N, f(P) = f(ˆ P).
The tops-only property severely constrains the scope for manipulation. No agent can
expect to be able to aﬀect the social outcome without modifying the peak on the range
of his reported preference. Perhaps not surprisingly, we show later in Proposition 2 that
this condition is closely related to strategy-proofness, in the sense that every strategy-proof
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which follows immediately from Deﬁnition 7, will be useful in the proof of Proposition 2.
Remark 1 A social choice rule f : SC
n → X is tops-only if and only if ∀i ∈ N, ∀(Pi,P−i) ∈
SC
n and ∀ ˆ Pi ∈ SC such that τ|rf( ˆ Pi) = τ|rf(Pi), f(Pi,P−i) = f( ˆ Pi,P−i).
Now we deﬁne a class of social choice rules that plays a crucial role in Section 3. To
do that we introduce the following notation. For any odd positive integer k, we say that
mk : Xk → X is the k-median function on Xk if for each x = (x1,...,xk) ∈ Xk, |{xi :
mk(x) ≥ xi}| ≥
(k+1)
2 and |{xj : xj ≥ mk(x)}| ≥
(k+1)
2 . Since k is odd, mk(x) is always well
deﬁned.
Deﬁnition 8 (emr) A social choice rule f : SC
n → X is an extended median rule if
there are n+1 ﬁxed ballots α1,...,αn+1 ∈ X such that for every preference proﬁle P ∈ SC
n,
f(P) = m2n+1(τ(P1),...,τ(Pn), α1,...,αn+1).
We denote by fe a social choice rule that satisﬁes Deﬁnition 8, and by EMR the family
of all such rules. A particular case of interest within this family is the well-known median
choice rule, denoted fm. This rule is obtained from fe by assigning (n+1)/2 ﬁxed ballots
at X = minX and the rest at X = maxX, if n is odd; and n/2 at X and n/2 + 1 at X if n
is even and fm breaks the ties in favor of the largest median peak. Alternatively, when n is
even and fm breaks the ties in favor of the smallest median peak, then n/2+1 ﬁxed ballots
are placed at X and the remaining n/2 at X.
Proceeding in a similar way, we can derive other rules from EMR, by restricting each
αi to a particular value of X. For example, if αi = α ∈ X for all i = 1,...,n + 1, then
fe is completely insensitive to the preferences reported by the individuals. We might want
to exclude such undesirable rules and, in particular, require Pareto eﬃciency. A social
choice rule f : SC
n → X is Pareto eﬃcient if ∀P ∈ SC
n there is no y ∈ X such that
∀i ∈ N, y Pi f(P). Hence, to eliminate the possibility of ineﬃciency, we set αn = X and
αn+1 = X. By doing so, we derive a social choice rule f∗ with the property that for all
P ∈ SC
n, f∗(P) = m2n−1(τ(P1),...,τ(Pn), α1,...,αn−1). This rule is called an eﬃcient
extended median rule, and it is characterized by n − 1 ﬁxed ballots located on X. The
set of all such rules is denoted by EMR∗.
Finally, we can also restrict each αi to take its value at either X or X, so that each ﬁxed
ballot is either a leftist or a rightist ballot. The family of social choice rules derived in that
way was ﬁrst introduced by Moulin [26], and is known as positional dictatorships.
11A similar result holds when preferences are single-peaked, since every strategy-proof social choice rule
whose range is an interval satisﬁes tops-only (see, for instance, Weymark [35] and Ching [10]).
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n → X is a positional dictatorship if
there are n − 1 ﬁxed ballots α1,...,αn−1 ∈ {X,X} such that for all P ∈ SC
n, f(P) =
m2n−1(τ(P1),...,τ(Pn), α1,...,αn−1).
These rules select the j-th peak among the tops of the reported preference orderings, for
some j ∈ {1,...,n}. For example, if j = 1, we have the leftist rule, which always chooses the
smallest reported peak. The median choice rule fm is also a particular case. We denote by
fj the positional dictatorship that selects, for all P ∈ SC
n, the alternative of the sequence
τ(P1),...,τ(Pn) placed at the j-th position according with the order > of X. This rule is
obtained from f∗ by locating n−j ﬁxed ballots at X and j −1 at X. The family of all such
rules is denoted by PD = {fj}j∈N.
3 Characterization
In this section, we prove that the set of positional dictatorships is the only family of social
choice rules that satisﬁes unanimity, anonymity and strategy-proofness on a maximal single-
crossing domain. At the end, we also show that this is a tight characterization, in the sense
that relaxing any of the previous conditions enlarges indeed the family of social choice rules.
We start by proving that every positional dictatorship is group strategy-proof.
Proposition 1 Every positional dictatorship fj is group strategy-proof on SC
n.
Proof. Fix fj ∈ PD. Suppose, by contradiction, there exist a coalition S ⊆ N, a proﬁle
(PS,P¯ S) ∈ SC
n, and a joint deviation ˆ PS ∈ SC
|S| for S such that fj(ˆ PS,P¯ S)Pi fj(PS,P¯ S)
for all i ∈ S. To simplify, denote τ = fj(PS,P¯ S) and ˆ τ = fj(ˆ PS,P¯ S), and let ˆ τ > τ.
By deﬁnition, fj ∈ PD implies αi ∈ {X,X} for all i = 1,...,n − 1. Hence, τ and
ˆ τ must coincide with the tops reported by two individuals. Denote these agents by k and
k′, and their preferences by Pk and Pk′, respectively. We show next that, for all i ∈ S,
τ(Pi) > τ. Suppose not. That is, assume τ ≥ τ(Pi) for some agent i ∈ S. If τ(Pi) = τ, then
τ Pi ˆ τ, which contradicts our initial hypothesis. Instead, suppose τ > τ(Pi). Since ˆ τ Pi τ and
(PS,P¯ S) ∈ SC
n, by SC1 we have that ˆ τ P τ for all P ≻ Pi. Hence, Pi ≻ Pk. Otherwise,
ˆ τ > τ, Pk ≻ Pi and ˆ τ Pi τ would imply ˆ τ Pk τ, contradicting that τ = τ(Pk). And again, by





ˆ τ = m
2n−1({τ( ˆ Pi)}i∈S,{τ(Pj)}j∈¯ S,α1,...,αn−1).
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for all i ∈ S, we would have that ˆ τ = τ, because we already saw that τ(Pi) > τ for all
i ∈ S. Thus, if we rename ({τ( ˆ Pi)}i∈S,{τ(Pj)}j∈¯ S,α1,...,αn−1) as (y1,...,y2n−1), it follows
that |{j ∈ {1,...,(2n − 1)} : τ ≥ yj}| ≥ n. But then τ ≥ m2n−1(y1,...,y2n−1). That is,
fj(PS,P¯ S) ≥ fj(ˆ PS,P¯ S), contradicting that ˆ τ > τ. Therefore, fj is gsp on SC
n. ￿
Falling short of Moulin’s [25] results, who proved that every extended median rule is
strategy-proof on single-peaked preferences, Proposition 1 shows that every positional dic-
tatorship is group strategy-proof (and, consequently, strategy-proof) on any single-crossing
domain. Instead, we claim that other extended median rules, which allow the social choice
to be a ﬁxed ballot, are not guaranteed to be strategy-proof on single-crossing preferences.
Example 4 illustrates this claim.
Example 4 Consider a society with three agents, N = {1,2,3}, and three alternatives,
X = {x,y,z}. Let individual preferences on X be as follows: P1 = (xy z), P2 = (xz y) and
P3 = (z y x). As we said in Example 1, these preferences are single-crossing with respect
to z > y > x and P3 ≻ P2 ≻ P1. Fix a social choice rule f ∈ EMR∗, and assume
that α1 = y and α2 = z. Note that α1 coincides with neither individuals’ most preferred
alternatives nor with the end points of X. Moreover, f(P) = m5(x,x,z,α1,α2) = y. Thus,
individual 2, who prefers that the group’s choice be either x or z instead of alternative y, can
manipulate f by declaring the insincere preference ˆ P2 = (z y x). This causes the outcome to
become f( ˆ P2,P−2) = m5(x,z,z,α1,α2) = z. Therefore, agent 2’s deviation is proﬁtable and
individual manipulation cannot be excluded.
The previous example shows that strategy-proofness is not assured for every eﬃcient
extended median rule because, with the exception of the subclass of positional dictatorships,
all other extended median rules do not guarantee that the chosen alternative is always the
most preferred alternative declared by an individual. However, as the proof of Proposition
1 illustrates, this information is used in a fundamental way to rule out preferences that may
create incentives for manipulation. The reason for that lies in the fact that the single-crossing
property is a restriction on the distribution of preferences across individuals, but it does not
exclude a priori any preference relation.
Thus, to get rid of the undesirable orderings, i.e. those which provide incentives to
misrepresent the true preferences, the argument cannot rely on the shape of individual
preferences, as it happens under single-peakedness. On the contrary, the proof of Proposition
1 shows that the argument exploits (i) that the social choice is the most preferred alternative
declared by an individual, (ii) the preference ordering of that agent; and (iii) the correlation
between preferences in a set with the single-crossing property. Remarkably, no information
about the shape of the preference relations is necessary to guarantee strategy-proofness.
16Of course, the conjecture that only positional dictatorships are not manipulable on a
maximal single-crossing domain stands in sharp contrast with the main result under the
single-peakedness restriction, where every extended median rule (not just positional dicta-
torships) has been shown to be strategy-proof. In the next theorem we formalize this conjec-
ture and we show that positional dictatorships can be characterized by strategy-proofness,
anonymity and unanimity. The proof of this result will occupy the remainder of the paper.
Theorem 1 Let SC be a maximal set of single-crossing preferences. A social choice rule
f : SC
n → X is unanimous, anonymous and strategy-proof if and only if f is a positional
dictatorship.
Proof. See Appendix B. ￿
The proof of Theorem 1, which is carried out in Appendix B for expositional convenience,
rests on three main results, each of them important in it own right. The ﬁrst one, summarized
in Proposition 2, shows that on a maximal set of single-crossing preferences the tops-only
property is implied by strategy-proofness. This result is a major step in doing the proof of
Theorem 1, and is consistent with other results in the literature on strategy-proofness. In
short, it captures the intuitive idea that social choice rules that use too much information
from individuals’ preferences are easier to manipulate.
Proposition 2 Let SC be a maximal set of single-crossing preferences. A social choice rule
f : SC
n → X is strategy-proof only if f is tops-only.
Proof. See Appendix A. ￿
Apart from Proposition 2, the proof of Theorem 1 also involves two additional results,
which are summarized in Lemma 1 and 2, respectively. The ﬁrst of these lemmas points
out that, if a social choice rule is unanimous and strategy-proof (and therefore tops-only),
then no individual must be able to proﬁt by reporting extreme preference relations, unless
such extreme preferences constitute the individual’s true ordering. This “median property”
at the individual level must simultaneously hold for every agent.
To present this more formally, in the sequel we use P (respectively, P) to denote the
most leftist (respectively, rightist) preference relation on X according with the linear order
>, so that for all x,y ∈ X, xP y (respectively, yP x) if and only if y > x. Clearly, τ(P) = X
and τ(P) = X. Moreover, it is easy to check that these rankings always belong to SC.
Lemma 1 Let SC be a maximal set of single-crossing preferences. A social choice rule
f : SC




17Proof. Let f be un and sp on SC
n. By Proposition 2, f is to on SC
n. Fix a proﬁle
P ∈ SC
n and an individual i ∈ N. If f(Pi,P−i) > f(P i,P−i), then f(Pi,P−i)Pi f(Pi,P−i).
Thus, agent i would like to manipulate f at (P i,P−i) via Pi, a contradiction. Hence,
f(Pi,P−i) ≥ f(Pi,P−i).
Two cases are possible.
Case 1: f(Pi,P−i) ≥ τ(Pi). Then, m3(τ(Pi),f(Pi,P−i),f(Pi,P−i)) = f(Pi,P−i). As-
sume, by contradiction, f(P)  = f(Pi,P−i). First, suppose f(Pi,P−i) > f(P). If Pi ≻ P i,
SC1 would imply that f(Pi,P−i)Pi f(Pi,P−i), which contradicts sp. Thus, since P i is agent
i’s most leftist preference relation, Pi is identical to P i and f(Pi,P−i) = f(Pi,P−i), which
contradicts that by hypothesis f(P)  = f(P i,P−i). So, f(P) > f(Pi,P−i), implying that
f(Pi,P−i) > τ(Pi). By sp, f(Pi,P−i)Pi f(Pi,P−i). Hence, τ(Pi)  = f(Pi,P−i). Further-
more, f(Pi,P−i)  = τ(P i), because f(P i,P−i) > τ(Pi) ≥ τ(P i) = X. In fact, as can be
inferred from Figure 3, f(Pi,P−i)  = τ(Pj) for all j  = i. Otherwise, if f(Pi,P−i) = τ(Pj)
for some j ∈ N\{i}, then Pj ≻ Pi, because f(Pi,P−i) > τ(Pi). However, by SC2, Pj ≻ Pi,
f(Pi,P−i) > f(Pi,P−i) and f(Pi,P−i)Pj f(Pi,P−i) would imply f(Pi,P−i)Pi f(Pi,P−i), a
contradiction.
Step 1. Assume there is a preference P α
i ∈ P, between P i and Pi, such that
(i) τ(P α
i ) = τ(Pi), and
(ii) f(Pi,P−i)P α
i f(Pi,P−i), (see Figure 3).
If P α
i ∈ SC, we are done. By to, f(P α




i ,P−i), which contradicts strategy-proofness.
Step 2. On the other hand, if P α
i  ∈ SC, then there must exist a preference P
β
i ∈ SC
which stops P α
i to be part of SC. That is, there must be a P
β
i ∈ SC such that P
β
i ≺ Pi and






Figure 3 represents this ordering. Clearly, P α
i must be above P
β
i , because the ideal
point τ(P α
i ) is greater than τ(P
β
i ). At the same time, P α




i f(Pi,P−i) and f(Pi,P−i)P
β
i f(Pi,P−i), being f(Pi,P−i) > f(Pi,P−i). Of
course, these two requirements cannot be simultaneously satisﬁed. Therefore P α
i  ∈ SC.
Step 3. If f(Pi,P−i) > f(P
β
i ,P−i), then i can manipulate f at (Pi,P−i) via P
β
i be-
cause, by deﬁnition of P i, a lower alternative is always preferred. On the other hand, if
















Figure 3: What’s going on in Case 1?
f(P
β
i ,P−i) = f(Pi,P−i), then i can manipulate f at (P
β





i f(Pi,P−i). Hence, f(P
β
i ,P−i) > f(Pi,P−i). Furthermore, f(Pi,P−i) ≥
f(P
β
i ,P−i). To see this, recall that Pi ≻ P
β




i f(Pi,P−i), Thus, if
f(P
β
i ,P−i) > f(Pi,P−i), then SC1 would imply f(P
β
i ,P−i)Pi f(Pi,P−i), a contradiction.
To summarize, f(Pi,P−i) ≥ f(P
β
i ,P−i) > f(Pi,P−i).
Step 4. Repeating Step 1, suppose there is a preference P
α+1
i ∈ SC, between Pi and P
β
i ,
such that (i) τ(P
α+1
i ) = τ(P
β













i ,P−i), contradicting that f is sp.
On the contrary, if P
α+1
i  ∈ SC, then, repeating the argument behind Step 2, there must
exist a preference P
β+1




i and (i) τ(P
β
i ) > τ(P
β+1





i f(P i,P−i). By Step 3, f(P
β
i ,P−i) ≥ f(P
β+1
i ,P−i) > f(Pi,P−i).
If we go back to Step 1 and we continue applying Steps 1 to 3 repeatedly, then
either we eventually get the desired contradiction or, after say ℓ interactions, we get
a preference P
β+ℓ
i ∈ SC, between P i and P
β+ℓ−1
i , such that τ(P
β+ℓ





i f(Pi,P−i). By the tops-only property, f(P
β+ℓ
i ,P−i) = f(Pi,P−i).
Therefore, i can manipulate f at (P
β+ℓ
i ,P−i) via P
β+ℓ−1
i .
Case 2: f(Pi,P−i) > τ(Pi) > f(Pi,P−i).13 Then, m3(τ(Pi),f(Pi,P−i),f(Pi,P−i)) =
τ(Pi). Assume, by contradiction, f(P)  = τ(Pi). Without loss of generality, sup-
pose τ(Pi) > f(P), so that f(Pi,P−i) > f(P). By sp, f(Pi,P−i)Pi f(Pi,P−i) and
f(Pi,P−i)Pi f(Pi,P−i).
13The remaining case where τ(Pi) ≥ f(P i,P−i) is similar to Case 1.
19Step 1. Suppose there is a preference P α
i ∈ SC, between Pi and P i, such that
(i) τ(P α
i ) = τ(Pi), and
(ii) f(Pi,P−i)P α
i f(Pi,P−i), (see Figure 4).
By to, f(P α
i ,P−i) = f(Pi,P−i). Thus, f(Pi,P−i)P α
i f(P α

















Figure 4: What’s going on in Case 2?
Step 2. If P α
i  ∈ SC, then there is a preference P
β
i ∈ SC such that P
β
i ≻ Pi and
(i) τ(P
β
i ) > τ(Pi), and
(ii) f(Pi,P−i)P
β
i f(Pi,P−i), (see Figure 4).
Step 3. If f(P
β
i ,P−i) > f(Pi,P−i), then i can manipulate f at (Pi,P−i) via P
β
i be-
cause, by deﬁnition of Pi, a greater alternative is always preferred. On the other hand, if
f(P
β
i ,P−i) = f(Pi,P−i), then i can manipulate f at (P
β





i f(Pi,P−i). Hence, f(Pi,P−i) > f(P
β
i ,P−i). Furthermore, f(P
β
i ,P−i) ≥
f(Pi,P−i). To see this, recall that Pi ≺ P
β




i f(Pi,P−i), Thus, if
f(Pi,P−i) > f(P
β
i ,P−i), then SC2 would imply f(P
β
i ,P−i)Pi f(Pi,P−i), a contradiction.
To summarize, f(Pi,P−i) > f(P
β
i ,P−i) ≥ f(Pi,P−i).
Step 4. Repeating Step 1, suppose there is a preference P
α+1
i ∈ SC, between Pi and P
β
i ,
such that (i) τ(P
α+1
i ) = τ(P
β













i ,P−i), a contradiction.
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α+1
i  ∈ SC, then, repeating the argument behind Step 2, there must
exist a preference P
β+1




i and (i) τ(P
β+1
i ) > τ(P
β





i f(P i,P−i). By Step 3, f(Pi,P−i) > f(P
β+1
i ,P−i) ≥ f(P
β
i ,P−i).
If we go back to Step 1 and we continue applying Steps 1 to 3 over and over again, then in
the end either we get the desired contradiction or, after say ℓ interactions, we ﬁnd a P
β+ℓ
i ∈
SC, between P i and P
β+ℓ−1
i , such that τ(P
β+ℓ







i ,P−i) = f(Pi,P−i). Therefore, i can manipulate f at (P
β+ℓ
i ,P−i) via P
β+ℓ−1
i ,
contradicting that f is strategy-proof. ￿
Finally, the proof of Theorem 1 also beneﬁts from Lemma 2, according to which
a strategy-proof and unanimous social choice rule must satisfy a property called top-
monotonicity. Roughly speaking, this property ensures that collective choices do not respond
perversely to changes in individuals’ ideal points.
Deﬁnition 10 (tm) A social choice rule f : SC
n → X is top-monotonic if ∀i ∈ N,
∀(Pi,P−i) ∈ SC
n and ∀ ˆ Pi ∈ SC such that τ( ˆ Pi) ≥ τ(Pi), f( ˆ Pi,P−i) ≥ f(Pi,P−i).
Like before, assume P (respectively, P) denote the most leftist (respectively, rightist)
preference relation on X according with the linear order >.
Lemma 2 Let SC be a maximal set of single-crossing preferences. If a social choice rule
f : SC
n → X is unanimous and strategy-proof, then f is top-monotonic.
Proof. Let f be un and sp on SC
n. Consider any individual i ∈ N, any proﬁle (Pi,P−i) ∈
SC
n and any admissible deviation P ′
i ∈ SC, such that τ(P ′
i) ≥ τ(Pi). We want to show that
f(P ′
i,P−i) ≥ f(Pi,P−i). Three cases are possible.
Case 1. If we have that τ(Pi) ≥ f(Pi,P−i), then m3(τ(Pi),f(Pi,P−i),f(Pi,P−i)) =
m3(τ(P ′
i),f(Pi,P−i),f(Pi,P−i)), because sp implies that f(Pi,P−i) ≥ f(Pi,P−i), and
τ(P ′
i) ≥ τ(Pi) by hypothesis. Therefore, by Lemma 1, f(P ′
i,P−i) = f(Pi,P−i).
Case 2. If f(Pi,P−i) > τ(Pi) > f(Pi,P−i), then m3(τ(Pi),f(Pi,P−i),f(Pi,P−i)) =
τ(Pi); and, given that τ(P ′
i) ≥ τ(Pi), m3(τ(P ′
i),f(Pi,P−i),f(Pi,P−i)) ≥ τ(Pi). Therefore,
by Lemma 1, f(P ′
i,P−i) ≥ f(Pi,P−i).
Case 3. Finally, if f(Pi,P−i) ≥ τ(Pi), then m3(τ(P ′
i),f(Pi,P−i),f(Pi,P−i)) ≥
m3(τ(Pi),f(Pi,P−i),f(Pi,P−i)) = f(Pi,P−i). Hence, by Lemma 1, f(P ′
i,P−i) ≥
f(Pi,P−i). ￿
Under the hypotheses of Theorem 1, the social choice always coincides with an individual’s
most preferred alternative. Thus, a corollary that can be immediately derived from it is that,
on a maximal set of single-crossing preferences, every unanimous, anonymous and strategy-
proof social choice rule satisﬁes Pareto eﬃciency.
21Corollary 1 Let SC be a maximal set of single-crossing preferences. If a social choice rule
f : SC
n → X is unanimous, anonymous and strategy-proof, then f is Pareto eﬃcient.
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, there exists a social choice rule f that satisﬁes the
hypotheses of Corollary 1, but f is not Pareto eﬃcient. Then, there must exist P ∈ SC
n,
and a pair x, y ∈ X, x  = y, such that f(P) = x, while y Pi x for all i ∈ N. Hence, for all
i = 1,...n, f(P)  = τ(Pi), contradicting that, by Theorem 1, f ∈ PD. ￿
In addition to the previous corollary, under the hypotheses of Theorem 1, it is also
possible to show that the set of admissible preferences has the single-peaked property over
the range of the social choice rule. More formally, for any set Y ⊂ X and any preference
P ∈ SC, let P|Y be the restriction of the binary relation P over the elements of Y . Denote
by SC|Y the set containing the restriction of each preference P ∈ SC over Y . We refer to
SC|Y as the restriction of SC on the set Y ⊂ X.
Lemma 3 Let SC be a maximal set of single-crossing preferences. If a social choice rule
f : SC
n → X is unanimous, anonymous and strategy-proof, then the restriction of SC on
the range rf has the single-peaked property.
Proof. The proof is based on Saporiti and Tohm´ e [32]. Fix a maximal set SC ⊂ P with
the single-crossing property with respect to > and ≻. Take a un, an and sp social choice
rule f : SC
n → X. Assume, by contradiction, there exists a preference P|rf ∈ SC|rf which
is not single-peaked on rf with respect to the order linear > of X. Then, there must be a
triple x,y,z ∈ rf such that x > y > z and xP y and z P y. By Theorem 1, y = τ|rf(P ′)
for some P ′ ∈ SC. If P ′ ≻ P, then, by SC1, x > y and xP y imply xP ′y, contradicting
that y = τ|rf(P ′). Hence, P ≻ P ′. However, since y > z and z P y, SC2 implies z P ′ y, a
contradiction. Therefore, the set SC|rf has the single-peaked property on rf. ￿
An immediate corollary of Lemma 3 is therefore that SC|rf is a regular domain. A social
choice rule f : SC → X has a regular domain if for every α ∈ rf there is a preference
P α ∈ SC such that τ|rf(P α) = α (Weymark [35]).
Corollary 2 Let SC be a maximal set of single-crossing preferences. If a social choice rule
f : SC
n → X is unanimous, anonymous and strategy-proof, then the restriction of SC on
the range rf is a regular domain.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 3. ￿
Finally, we close this section discussing the independence of the axioms used in Theorem
1, as well as the role of the maximal domain condition speciﬁed in Deﬁnition 2. First, con-
sider the consequence of relaxing strategy-proofness. As we explained before, any eﬃcient
22extended median rule that it is not a positional dictatorship may be subject to individual
manipulation on a single-crossing domain (see Example 4). However, all of them are anony-
mous and unanimous. Thus, the family that satisﬁes these two axioms on SC
n is larger than
the set of positional dictatorships.
Second, consider the consequence of relaxing unanimity. Deﬁne a social choice rule f in
such a way that, for each P ∈ SC
n, f(P) = a ∈ X. It is clear that f is anonymous and
strategy-proof. However, f violates unanimity, since rf = {a}. Hence, f  ∈ PD.
Third, relax anonymity, by ﬁxing an agent j ∈ N and deﬁning a social choice rule f in
such a way that, for all P ∈ SC
n, f(P) = τ(Pj). It is immediate to see that f is unanimous
and strategy-proof. However, it violates anonymity, because f is dictatorial.
Lastly, to illustrate why the maximal domain condition is needed to derive the main
results of this paper, let N = {1,2}, X = {x,y,z}, with z > y > x, and SC = {P,P},
where P = (xyz) and P = (z y x). As is clear from Example 3, the set of preferences SC
is not a maximal set with the single-crossing property. Deﬁne f by setting f(P,P) = x,
f(P,P) = z and f(P,P) = f(P,P) = y. This function satisﬁes unanimity, anonymity and
strategy-proofness. However, f is not a positional dictatorship, because y is chosen at (P,P)
and at (P,P), but y is the most preferred alternative of nobody at those proﬁles.14
4 Robustness
So far, we have assumed that every individual i ∈ N is endowed with a preference Pi
draw from the restricted domain SC, and is entitled to report a preference relation (not
necessarily the true one) from the same admissible set. That is, we have restricted both the
true preferences of all individuals and their strategies, i.e., the orderings they are permitted to
announce, to the same maximal set of single-crossing preferences. The main result obtained
from that assumption is that a social choice rule is anonymous, unanimous and strategy-proof
if and only if it is a positional dictatorship.
There are two main concerns regarding this result. First, there is a question of how easy
to describe is the set of admissible preferences. We saw in Section 2.4 that in the applications
the set of individual preferences with the single-crossing property is well deﬁned and can be
derived from standard assumptions of economics. However, to be able to describe this set,
the mechanism designer would probably need to already possess some information about
individuals’ preferences, though not about any particular individual’s ordering. Given that
the goal of this paper is to study social choice problems where individual preferences are
14I am grateful to one of the referees for suggesting this example.
23privately observed, the information require by the planner to specify the set of admissible
reports weakens the contribution of Theorem 1.
Nevertheless, as Campbell and Kelly [9], p. 567, say, “there is a sense in which results
based on a domain of single-peaked preferences have the same drawback: Although single-
peaked domains can be deﬁned as product sets, single-peakedness is characterized by means
of a particular linear ordering, and an individual would have to know the linear ordering to
which the reported preference is admissible, before being convinced that his own reported
preference is admissible”.
Furthermore, while in some cases this ordering is natural and, therefore, the assumption
that it is commonly known (included by the planner) is not too demanding, in others it is not
necessarily obvious. Suppose, for example, that alternatives are political candidates. Then,
the way in which individuals agree to locate these candidates on a one-dimensional political
scale is not immediate. Moreover, that ordering not only determines which preferences can be
declared, but it also provides information about other individuals’ preferences. For instance,
if X = {x,y,z} and (Pi)i∈N is single-peaked with respect to x > y > z, then the order of
the alternatives reveals that nobody holds a preference which ranks y bottom (such as the
relations P = (xz y) and P ′ = (z xy)).
Apart from the diﬃculty to specify the set of possible reports, a second concern is that,
even if the mechanism designer would have had the information to do so, it would still be
unclear how to deal with declarations which are not in the admissible set. Can we tell an
individual that, despite the fact that preferences are not directly observed, on the basis of our
beliefs about “how they should be”, he cannot submit a certain preference relation because
we consider it somehow “unreasonable” and, therefore, it has been removed from the set of
possible declarations?
Once again, this aﬀects not only the analysis on single-crossing preferences, but also
on other domain restrictions. Consider, for instance, the case where preferences satisfy the
single-peaked property over the real line. For the planner, it would not be diﬃcult to describe
the set of admissible preferences, because alternatives are ordered according with the usual
order of the real numbers. However, suppose individual i reports a preference that is not
single-peaked on that order. What can we do in such situation? Can we say to individual i
that he is not entitled to have such preference relation? In a democracy, every individual is
free to order the alternatives in the way he wishes to do so, independently of how sensible
we think these orderings are. Thus, assuming that preference relations which do not verify
the domain restriction will not be permitted seems neither realistic nor democratic.
To deal with this problem, in this section we analyze the possibility of strengthening the
result of Theorem 1, by eliminating the requirement that individual reports be restricted to
be in the set SC. The analysis is inspired by Blin and Satterthwaite [7], who have done a
24similar exercise to assess the robustness of the strategy-proof result of majority rule with
Borda completion on single-peaked preferences when individual reports are allowed to be
outside the single-peaked domain.
Our ﬁndings are positive: If the true preferences of the society satisfy the single-crossing
property, then no individual can ever proﬁtably manipulate a positional dictatorship by
reporting a preference which is not his true preference relation, independently of whether
the insincere preference belongs to the single-crossing domain or not. Conversely, if we allow
deviations outside the single-crossing domain, every anonymous, unanimous and strategy-
proof social choice rule must be a positional dictatorship on the set of preferences with the
single-crossing property.
To show this more formally, let us now redeﬁne a social choice rule so that it associates
a feasible alternative to every proﬁle of complete, transitive and antisymmetric preferences;
i.e., let f : Pn → X. Following Blin and Satterthwaite [7], a social choice rule f is said
manipulable on SC
n if there exists an individual i ∈ N, a proﬁle (Pi,P−i) ∈ SC
n and a
deviation ˆ Pi ∈ P such that f( ˆ Pi,P−i)Pi f(Pi,P−i). A social choice rule is strategy-proof
on SC
n if and only if it is not manipulable on SC
n. Notice that in Deﬁnition 3 we have
omitted the qualiﬁcation “on SC
n” when we deﬁned strategy-proofness, because that was
also the domain of the social choice rule. Instead, here the social choice rule is deﬁned on
a larger domain, actually on the set of all strict preferences; but it is required to satisfy
strategy-proofness only on the domain of individuals’ true preferences.
Proceeding in a similar way, we can redeﬁne anonymity and unanimity. A social choice
rule f : Pn → X is unanimous on SC
n if ∀x ∈ X and ∀P ∈ SC
n such that τ(Pi) = x ∀i ∈ N,
f(P) = x. Similarly, f : Pn → X is anonymous on SC
n if f(P) = f(ˆ P) for every permutation
P of ˆ P ∈ SC
n. Finally, we can extend the deﬁnition of positional dictatorships to the
set of all complete, transitive and antisymmetric preference proﬁles, and to any nonempty
subset of it. Speciﬁcally, a social choice rule f : Pn → X is a positional dictatorship
on D ⊆ Pn if there are n − 1 ﬁxed ballots α1,...,αn−1 ∈ {X,X} such that ∀P ∈ D,
f(P) = m2n−1(τ(P1),...,τ(Pn), α1,...,αn−1). For simplicity, when D coincides with Pn,
we simply say that f is a positional dictatorship.
Theorem 2 Every positional dictatorship fj : Pn → X is strategy-proof on SC
n. Con-
versely, if SC is a maximal set of single-crossing preferences, then every social choice rule
f : Pn → X that is unanimous, anonymous and strategy-proof on SC
n is a positional dicta-
torship on SC
n.
Proof. To prove the ﬁrst part of Theorem 2, ﬁx any positional dictatorship fj : Pn → X
and suppose fj is manipulable by i ∈ N at a proﬁle (Pi,P−i) ∈ SC
n via a preference re-
lation ˆ Pi ∈ P, which is not necessarily in SC. Without loss of generality, suppose that
25fj( ˆ Pi,P−i) > fj(Pi,P−i). Since fj always chooses an individual’s most preferred alter-
native, let fj(Pi,P−i) coincide with individual k’s (k  = i) ideal point τ(Pk) according
with Pk. By SC1, (Pi,P−i) ∈ SC
n and fj( ˆ Pi,P−i)Pi fj(Pi,P−i) imply Pi ≻ Pk. There-
fore, τ(Pi) > fj(Pi,P−i). Moreover, fj(Pi,P−i) > τ( ˆ Pi). Otherwise, we would have
fj( ˆ Pi,P−i) = fj(Pi,P−i). Hence, by deﬁnition of fj, fj(Pi,P−i) ≥ fj( ˆ Pi,P−i), which
contradicts the initial hypothesis that fj( ˆ Pi,P−i) > fj(Pi,P−i). Therefore, fj is sp on SC
n.
The proof of the second part of Theorem 2 is immediate. Consider a social choice rule
f : Pn → X that is unanimous, anonymous and strategy-proof on SC
n. Deﬁne the social
choice rule g : SC
n → X such that, for all P ∈ SC
n, g(P) = f(P). Simple inspection shows
that g is an, un and sp. Thus, by Theorem 1, g ∈ PD; and, by deﬁnition, f is a positional
dictatorship on SC
n. ￿
Notice that the ﬁrst part of Theorem 2 is proved applying the same argument used in the
proof to Proposition 1. This is because the proof of Proposition 1 does not use any particular
structure of the deviation proﬁle ( ˆ Pi,P−i). What really matters is that (Pi,P−i) is in SC
n.
On the other hand, the second part of Theorem 2 holds because every social choice rule which
is not manipulable when individuals can report any strict preference relation must be so when
they are allowed to declare only preferences from a strictly smaller subset. However, we have
already shown in Theorem 1 that, when reports are restricted to SC, every unanimous,
anonymous and strategy-proof social choice rule is a positional dictatorship. Hence, if we
dispense of the assumption that declarations are restricted to the set with the single-crossing
property, we must still obtain the same family of rules on the restricted domain.
Finally, note that Theorem 2 does not provide a full characterization, because we haven’t
determined the form of a unanimous, anonymous and strategy-proof social choice rule outside
the domain of preferences with the single-crossing property. However, it does show that
the rules obtained in any of such characterizations coincide over a maximal single-crossing
domain with the rules characterized in Theorem 1. This, together with the fact that every
positional dictatorship is strategy-proof on single-crossing preferences, allow us to conclude
that the result stated in Theorem 1 is robust to the kind of perturbations introduced in this
section.
5 Final remarks
This paper analyzes strategy-proof collective choice rules when individuals have single-
crossing preferences on a ﬁnite and ordered set of social alternatives. While the single-
crossing property has been shown to be suﬃcient to ensure the existence of a Condorcet
winner, this result has been derived assuming that individuals sincerely declare their pref-
26erences. This naturally raises the issue of potential individual and group manipulation,
motivating the current research.
The main contributions of this article are the following. First of all, it shows that, in
addition to single-peakedness, single-crossing is another meaningful domain that guaran-
tees the existence of strategy-proof social choice rules. Speciﬁcally, it proves that every
positional dictatorship is group strategy-proof on any set of preferences with the single-
crossing property. Conversely, every social choice rule that satisﬁes anonymity, unanimity
and strategy-proofness on a maximal single-crossing domain is shown to be a member of this
family. These results are robust to deviations outside the single-crossing domain, provided
that individuals’ true preferences belong to that set.
A natural consequence of the previous characterization is that anonymity, unanimity
and strategy-proofness imply Pareto eﬃciency. Furthermore, although in our framework
individual preferences need not be convex over the set of alternatives, anonymity, unanimity
and strategy-proofness also imply that preferences must satisfy single-peakedness over the
range of the social choice rule.15 So, our results indicate that to rule out incentives to
misrepresent individual preferences some convexity and regularity of the domain is indeed
necessary.
Another important conclusion coming out from this research is that, on a maximal single-
crossing domain, strategy-proofness implies the tops-only property. The proof of this claim
does not completely follow the proof strategy recently proposed by Weymark [35], because
the non-convexities of single-crossing preferences make quite diﬃcult to directly prove that
the Le Breton–Weymark’s [22] regularity condition is satisﬁed. To avoid this, ﬁrst we prove
the claim in a two-person case, where unanimity over the range can be used without further
complications. And then we obtain a partial characterization of the social choice rule for the
case with only two individuals, which allows to prove the claim for more than two agents by
reducing the analysis to a situation where only two tops are diﬀerent.
Finally, this papers also shows that the Representative Voter Theorem has a well deﬁned
strategic foundation, in the sense that the median voter’s ideal point can be implemented
in dominant strategies by a direct mechanism. However, this conclusion holds on a subdo-
main of single-crossing preferences, the Cartesian product domain. Therefore, relaxing the
assumption that individuals sincerely reveal their preferences is not free.
Moreover, given that the domain of single-crossing preferences is somehow less natural
than the single-peaked domain, we also ﬁnd that the single-crossing version of the Median
Voter Theorem under incomplete information of individuals’ preferences would not probably
have the same appeal as its counterpart on single-peaked domains.
15Given a set X and a linear order > of X, a preference P ∈ P on X is convex with respect to > if for
every three distinct alternatives x,y,z ∈ X, xP y ⇒ yP z whenever y is between x and z.
276 Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 2
In order to prove Proposition 2, the following lemma will be extremely useful.
Lemma 4 Suppose f : SC
n → X is a strategy-proof social choice rule with n ≥ 1. For any
nonempty set S ⊆ N, any x ∈ rf and every proﬁle (PS,P¯ S) ∈ SC
n such that τ|O
f
S(P¯ S) (Pi) =
x for all i ∈ S, f(PS,P¯ S) = x.
Proof. The proof is domain independent and is based on Proposition 2 in Le Breton and
Weymark [22]. Assume f is sp on SC
n, and consider any coalition S ⊆ N, any alternative
x ∈ rf and any proﬁle (PS,P¯ S) ∈ SC
n such that ∀i ∈ S, τ|O
f
S(P¯ S)(Pi) = x. Suppose, by
contradiction, f(PS,P¯ S) = y  = x for some y ∈ X. Deﬁne the social choice rule g : SC
|S| →




S,P¯ S). It is easy to show that g is sp and
rg = O
f
S(P¯ S). Since x ∈ O
f
S(P¯ S), there exists e PS ∈ SC
|S| such that g(e PS) = f(e PS,P¯ S) = x.











S = (e Pi1,..., e Pi|S|−1,Pi|S|),
P
|S|
S = (e Pi1,..., e Pi|S|).
For all k = 0,1,...,|S|, denote zk = g(Pk
S) = f(Pk





S,P¯ S) = x. Such a j exists because g(P
|S|
S ) = f(e PS,P¯ S) = x. Moreover,
j  = 0, because by hypothesis g(P0
S) = f(PS,P¯ S) = y  = x. But, then agent ij ∈ S can
manipulate g at P
j−1
S via e Pij, a contradiction. ￿
From Lemma 4, we can derive Corollaries 3 and 4, whose proofs follow immediately by
setting S = {i} and S = N, respectively.
Corollary 3 If f : SC
n → X is a strategy-proof social choice rule, then for all i ∈ N, every
x ∈ rf and all (Pi,P−i) ∈ SC
n such that τ|O
f
i (P−i)(Pi) = x, f(Pi,P−i) = x.
Corollary 4 If f : SC
n → X is a strategy-proof social choice rule, then for all x ∈ rf and
all (Pi,P−i) ∈ SC
n such that τ|rf(Pi) = x for all i ∈ N, f(Pi,P−i) = x.
In words, Corollary 4 points out that a strategy-proof social choice rule must respect una-
nimity over the range, in the sense that if everyone has the same most preferred alternative
on the range of the social choice rule, then that alternative must be the social choice.
Finally, one last result that can be derived from Lemma 4 is the following:
28Corollary 5 If f : SC
n → X is a strategy-proof social choice rule, then for any nonempty
set S ⊂ N, every x ∈ rf and all (PS,P¯ S) ∈ SC




The proof of Corollary 5 is immediate from Corollary 4 (just take a preference relation
for each individual in the set ¯ S with the most preferred alternative over the range equal to
x). Roughly speaking, it says that if a social choice rule is strategy-proof and all agents in
a certain coalition agree on the most preferred alternative over the range of the rule, then
that alternative must be available in the option set of the remaining agents.
Our next lemma shows that, when there are only two individuals in the society, a social
choice rule is strategy-proof only if it satisﬁes the tops-only property. This, in turns, implies
that every two preferences in the admissible domain with the same most preferred alternative
over the range of the social choice rule must necessarily have the same top on any option
set generated by the preference of the other individual. This implication is an immediate
consequence of Remark 1 and Corollary 3.
Lemma 5 Let |N| = 2 and suppose SC is a maximal set of single-crossing preferences. A
social choice rule f : SC
2 → X is strategy-proof only if f is tops-only.
Proof. Assume, by contradiction, there exists a strategy-proof social choice rule f : SC
2 →
X which is not tops-only. By Remark 1, there must exist a proﬁle (P1,P2) ∈ SC
2 and
a preference ˆ P1 ∈ SC such that τ|rf( ˆ P1) = τ|rf(P1) and f( ˆ P1,P2) = y  = x = f(P1,P2).
By Corollary 3, τ|O
f
1(P2)(P1) = x and τ|O
f
1(P2)( ˆ P1) = y. Thus, if the tops-only property is
contradicted, there must be two preferences P1 and ˆ P1 in SC, with the same most preferred
alternative on rf, but with diﬀerent tops on an option set O
f
1(P2) generated by the preference
of the other agent. The rest of the proof consists in showing that this supposition leads to a
contradiction with the fact that f is a strategy-proof social choice rule. A similar argument
will be used along the proof of Lemma 7.
Without loss of generality, assume τ|O
f
1(P2)( ˆ P1) = y > x = τ|O
f
1(P2)(P1). Hence, ˆ P1 ≻
P1. Obviously, xP1 y, y ˆ P1 x, τ|rf(P1)  = x and τ|rf( ˆ P1)  = y. Furthermore, note that
xP2 τ|rf(P1). Otherwise, by Corollary 4, agent 2 can manipulate f at (P1,P2) via a ˜ P2 equal
to P1, (which renders τ|rf(P1)). Using a similar argument, y P2τ|rf(P1).
Two cases are possible, depending on the location of τ|rf(P1): (1) y > τ|rf(P1) > x; and
(2) y > x > τ|rf(P1).16 Notice that the ﬁrst case contradicts that O
f
1(P2) is an interval of rf,
because by hypothesis τ|rf(P1)  ∈ O
f
1(P2). On the other hand, the second case goes against
the regularity of SC, since x is between y and τ|rf(P1) and y ˆ P1x and τ|rf(P1) ˆ P1x, implying
16The remaining situation, where τ|rf(P1) > y > x, is similar to the second case.
29that no preference in the domain can rank x best. As we explain below, however, both cases
are ruled out by strategy-proofness. The reason for this is as follows.
Case 1: y > τ|rf(P1) > x. If P2 ≻ P1, we have that τ|rf(P1) > x and xP2 τ|rf(P1)
imply, by SC2, xP1 τ|rf(P1), a contradiction. Thus, P1 ≻ P2. But, then y > τ|rf(P1) and
y P2 τ|rf(P1) imply, by SC1, that y P1 τ|rf(P1), a contradiction.
Case 2: y > x > τ|rf(P1). Firstly, suppose τ|rf(P2) = x. Then, P2 ≻ P1. Otherwise,
P1 ≻ P2, x > τ|rf(P1) and xP2 τ|rf(P1) would imply, by SC1, xP1 τ|rf(P1). Similarly, ˆ P1 ≻
P2, since xP2 y implies xP y ∀P ≺ P2, and y ˆ P1 x by hypothesis. But, τ|rf(P1) ˆ P1x implies
τ|rf(P1)P x ∀P ≺ ˆ P1, contradicting that τ|rf(P2) = x. Hence, ∀j = 1,2, x  = τ|rf(Pj).
Secondly, if P1 ≻ P2, then τ|rf(P1)P1x implies τ|rf(P1)P2 x, a contradiction. Thus, P2 ≻
P1 and, therefore, τ|rf(P2) > τ|rf(P1). Similarly, if ˆ P1 ≻ P2, then τ|rf(P1) ˆ P1 τ|rf(P2) implies
τ|rf(P1)P2 τ|rf(P2). So, P2 ≻ ˆ P1. Moreover, y P2 x, since xP2 y would imply x ˆ P1 y. Finally,
if y > τ|rf(P2), then τ|rf(P2)P2 y would imply τ|rf(P2) ˆ P1y, contradicting sp, because, by
Corollary 4, agent 1 would proﬁtably manipulate f at ( ˆ P1,P2) via a ˜ P1 equal to P2. Hence,
τ|rf(P2) ≥ y, and we face a situation as in Figure 5.
t|rf(P1) x y
ˆ P1







Figure 5: What’s going on in Case 2?
Note that y  ∈ O
f
2(P1). Otherwise, there must be a P ′
2 ∈ SC such that f(P1,P ′
2) = y.
And, because y P2 x, it would follow that individual 2 can manipulate f at (P1,P2) via P ′
2.
Step 1. Take a preference P α
2 ∈ P, between P2 and ˆ P1, such that
(i) τ|O
f
2( ˆ P1)(P α
2 ) = y = τ|O
f




2 ) = τ|rf(P1), (see Figure 5).
30If P α
2 ∈ SC, we are done. By Corollary 3, f( ˆ P1,P α
2 ) = y and f(P1,P α
2 ) = τ|rf(P1).
Hence, agent 1 can manipulate f at ( ˆ P1,P α
2 ) via P1, contradicting that f is sp.
Step 2. On the contrary, if P α





2 ≺ P2, and an alternative zβ ∈ O
f
2(P1) such that









2 ) = zβ > τ|rf(P1), (see Figure 6).
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In words, if P α
2  ∈ SC, then there must be a P
β
2 in SC such that (i) P
β
2 is more leftist
than P α
2 regarding the top on O
f
2( ˆ P1); and (ii) P
β
2 is more rightist than P α
2 with respect to
the top on O
f
2(P1).17
Step 3. By Corollary 3, f( ˆ P1,P
β




2 ) and f(P1,P
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2 ) = τ|rf(P1), then agent 1 can manipulate
f at (P1,P
β
2 ) via ˆ P1. Furthermore, if zβ > x, then P2 ≻ P
β
2 and zβ P
β
2 x imply zβ P2x,
contradicting that x = τ|O
f
2(P1)(P2). Therefore, x ≥ zβ > τ|rf(P1).
Step 4. Proceeding like in Step 1, take a preference P
α+1
2 ∈ P such that
17The other possibility that can stop P α
2 to be in SC is a preference with a top lower than τ|rf(P1) on
O
f
2(P1) and a top greater than y on O
f














2 ) = τ|rf(P1), (see Figure 6).
If P
α+1
2 ∈ SC, we are done. By Corollary 3, we have that f(P1,P
α+1
2 ) = τ|rf(P1) and
f( ˆ P1,P
α+1




2 )  = τ|rf(P1). Hence, agent 1 can manipulate f at ( ˆ P1,P
α+1
2 ) via
P1, contradicting that f is sp.
On the contrary, if P
α+1
2  ∈ SC, then repeating the reasoning in Step 2, there must exist
a preference P
β+1




















2 ) = zβ+1 > τ|rf(P1), (see Figure 6).
Using the argument of Step 3, zβ ≥ zβ+1 > τ|rf(P1). Going back to Step 1 and repeating
the analysis over and over again, then in the end either, we get the desired contradiction at
some point in the process, or after a number of repetitions, say ℓ, we eventually arrive at
a preference P
β+ℓ
2 ∈ SC, between P
β+ℓ−1









2 ) = zβ+ℓ > τ|rf(P1). By Corollary 3, f( ˆ P1,P
β+ℓ
2 ) = τ|rf(P1) and
f(P1,P
β+ℓ
2 ) = zβ+ℓ  = τ|rf(P1). Hence, agent 1 can manipulate f at (P1,P
β+ℓ
2 ) via ˆ P1, a
contradiction. Therefore, f is to on SC
2. ￿
Corollary 6 Let |N| = 2 and suppose SC is a maximal set of single-crossing preferences.
A social choice rule f : SC
2 → X is strategy-proof only if for all i ∈ N and all P ∈ SC
2,
f(Pi,P−i) = m3(τ|rf(Pi),f(Pi,P−i),f(Pi,P−i)).
Proof. Immediate from Lemmas 1 and 5. ￿
Now, before generalizing Lemma 5 to the case where |N| > 2, we ﬁrst extend the tops-
only property to the option sets generated by a strategy-proof social choice rule. We do this
in two steps. First, we prove in Lemma 6 that the option set of any single individual i ∈ N
satisﬁes a tops-only property when there is agreement among the individuals in N\{i} as to
which alternative is best on the range. Then, in Lemma 7, we generalize this result to the
option set of any nonempty coalition of individuals and when the remaining agents do not
necessarily agree on the most preferred alternative over the range.
Lemma 6 Let SC be a maximal set of single-crossing preferences. If a social choice rule
f : SC




n−1 for which τ|rf(P ′
j) = τ|rf(P ′′

































such that, for all j,k ∈ N\{i}, τ|rf(P ′
j) = τ|rf(P ′′
k) = z for some z ∈ X. To simplify the
notation, assume P ′
j = P ′
k and P ′′
j = P ′′
















































































−i ), there exists e Pi ∈ SC such that f(e Pi,P
j∗−1
−i ) = x.




−i diﬀer only in one preference relation.






















































−{i,ℓ}. Deﬁne the two-person social choice
rule g : SC
2 → X in such a way that, for all (Pi,Pℓ) ∈ SC
2, g(Pi,Pℓ) = f(Pi,Pℓ,P
j∗−1
−{i,ℓ}).




−{i,ℓ}). By Corollary 5, z ∈ rg.
33Hence, τ|rg(P ′′
ℓ ) = τ|rg(P ′
ℓ) = z, because by hypothesis τ|rf(P ′′
ℓ ) = τ|rf(P ′
ℓ) = z and rg ⊆ rf.
By Lemma 5, g is tops-only. Therefore, g(e Pi,P ′′
ℓ ) = g(e Pi,P ′




−i ) = x. Thus, g(e Pi,P ′′
ℓ ) = x. That is, f(e Pi,P
j∗












Lemma 7 Let SC be a maximal set of single-crossing preferences. If a social choice rule
f : SC
n → X is strategy-proof, then for every coalition S ⊂ N and every two proﬁles
P′,P′′ ∈ SC
n such that τ|rf(P ′
i) = τ|rf(P ′′







Proof. We make the proof in four steps, though the crucial one is Step 1:
Step 1. Consider any individual i ∈ N and any two proﬁles ˆ P−i, ˇ P−i ∈ SC
n−1, such that
for all j,k ∈ N\{i}, ˆ Pj = ˆ Pk and ˇ Pj = ˇ Pk, and for each j ∈ N\{i}, τ|rf( ˆ Pj) = τ|rf( ˇ Pj) = z
for some z ∈ X. By Lemma 6, O
f
i (ˆ P−i) = O
f
i (ˇ P−i).
Fix any individual j  = i and any two preferences P ′
j,P ′′
j ∈ SC, such that τ|rf(P ′
j) =
w = τ|rf(P ′′
j ) for some w ∈ X. We want to show that O
f
i (P ′
j, ˆ P−{i,j}) = O
f
i (P ′′
j , ˆ P−{i,j}).
Deﬁne the 2-person social choice rule g : SC
2 → X in such a way that for all (Pi,Pj) ∈ SC
2,
g(Pi,Pj) = f(Pi,Pj, ˆ P−{i,j}). Since f is sp on SC
n, g is sp on SC
2, with range rg =
O
f
{i,j}(ˆ P−{i,j}). By Lemma 5, g is to over rg. If τ|rg(P ′
j) = τ|rg(P ′′
j ), then by applying Lemma






j ). Hence, by deﬁnition, O
f
i (P ′
j, ˆ P−{i,j}) = O
f
i (P ′′
j , ˆ P−{i,j}).
Instead, if τ|rg(P ′
j) = a  = b = τ|rg(P ′′
j ), then Lemma 6 cannot be used, because it rests
on the existence of a common peak on the range of the social choice rule. So, we proceed
as follows. Without loss of generality, let b > a, implying that P ′′





j)  = O
g
i(P ′′




α  ∈ O
g
i(P ′′
j ). Hence, there must be a e Pi ∈ SC such that g(e Pi,P ′





j ) = β  = α. By sp, αP ′
j β and β P ′′
j α. By single-crossing, P ′′
j ≻ P ′
j implies β > α.
We would like to ﬁnd two preferences P α
i ,P
β
i ∈ SC, not necessarily diﬀerent, such that:
(i) τ|rf(P α
i ) = w; (ii) g(P α
i ,P ′
j) = α; (iii) τ|rf(P
β
i ) = w; and (iv) g(P
β
i ,P ′′
j ) = β. We show
below that such preferences exist in SC. First, note that if e Pi is between P ′
j and P ′′
j , then we
already have the desired preferences, because in that case τ|rf(e Pi) = w. So, without loss of
generality, suppose e Pi ≻ P ′′
j , implying that τ|rg(e Pi) = c ≥ b. Clearly, β e Pi α, because β P ′′
j α.









where P i (respectively, Pi) represents the most rightist (respectively, leftist) ranking on X.
Applying Corollary 6 once again to g(Pi,P ′













j),g(Pi,P j),g(Pi,P j)). (4)
By Corollary 4, g(Pi,Pj) = Xrg and g(Pi,Pj) = Xrg, where Xrg = min(rg) and Xrg =
max(rg). Therefore, (3) can be rewritten as g(Pi,P ′
j) = m3(a,Xrg,g(Pi,Pj)), while (4)
becomes g(Pi,P ′
j) = m3(a,g(Pi,Pj),Xrg). It is immediate to see that g(Pi,P ′
j) ≥ g(Pi,P ′
j),
because (4) is at least a, while (3) is at most a. Hence, c > g(Pi,P ′
j), because c ≥ b > a.
Moreover, τ|rg(e Pi) = c cannot be between g(Pi,P ′
j) and g(Pi,P ′
j). Otherwise, (2) would
imply that g(e Pi,P ′
j) = c, contradicting the initial hypothesis that g(e Pi,P ′
j) = α (recall that
c  = α, because β e Pi α). Thus, c > g(Pi,P ′
j) ≥ g(Pi,P ′
j) and, therefore, α = g(Pi,P ′
j).
Take a preference P α
i equal to P ′′
j . By Corollary 6, g(P α
i ,P ′
j) = m3(b,g(Pi,P ′
j),g(Pi,P ′
j)).
Thus, if b ≥ g(Pi,P ′
j), we are done, since g(P α
i ,P ′
j) = α and, by deﬁnition, τ|rf(P α
i ) = w.
Instead, if g(Pi,P ′
j) > b, then α > b. Moreover, α > a, because b > a. And, by (4),
α = m3(a,g(Pi,Pj),Xrg) = g(Pi,Pj). Consider g(e Pi,P ′′
j ). By Corollary 6, g(e Pi,P ′′
j ) =
m3(b,g(e Pi,Pj),g(e Pi,Pj)), where
g(e Pi,Pj) = m
3(c,Xrg,g(Pi,Pj)), and (5)
g(e Pi,Pj) = m
3(c,g(Pi,Pj),Xrg). (6)
Note that (5) can be rewritten as g(e Pi,Pj) = m3(c,Xrg,α) = α, because c > α (recall
that c > g(Pi,P ′
j) = α). Moreover, since (6) is at least equal to c and we have assumed
above that α > b, it follows that g(e Pi,P ′′
j ) = m3(b,α,g(e Pi,Pj)) = α, contradicting that, by
hypothesis, g(e Pi,P ′′
j ) = β  = α.
Therefore, the previous argument shows that a preference P α
i with the properties speciﬁed
above exists in SC. In fact, it says that P α
i can be set equal to P ′′
j . Following a similar
reasoning, we prove next that P
β
i also exists in SC and is equal to P ′′











j ) = m3(b,Xrg,g(Pi,Pj) is at most equal to b, and g(Pi,P ′′
j ) =
m3(b,Xrg,g(Pi,P j)) is at least equal to b. Therefore, g(Pi,P ′′
j ) ≥ b ≥ g(Pi,P ′′
j ).
Since c ≥ b, we have two possibilities. First, suppose g(Pi,P ′′
j ) > c ≥ b ≥ g(Pi,P ′′
j ).
Hence, g(Pi,P ′′
j ) = g(Pi,P j). Consider g(e Pi,P ′




j ) ≥ g(Pi,P ′
j), because g(Pi,P ′′
j ) = m3(b,Xrg,g(Pi,Pj)) and g(Pi,P ′
j) =
m3(a,Xrg,g(Pi,Pj)). On the other hand, g(Pi,P ′
j) = m3(a,Xrg,g(Pi,Pj)). However, we
35have shown before that g(Pi,Pj) > b, because g(Pi,P j) = g(Pi,P ′′
j ) > c ≥ b. Therefore,
g(Pi,P ′
j) = g(Pi,Pj). To summarize, we have that g(Pi,P ′
j) = g(Pi,P ′′
j ) > c ≥ g(Pi,P ′′
j ) ≥
g(Pi,P ′
j). Therefore, by (2) and (7), g(e Pi,P ′
j) = c = g(e Pi,P ′′
j ), a contradiction.
Thus, c ≥ g(Pi,P ′′
j ) ≥ g(Pi,P ′′
j ) and, by (7), g(e Pi,P ′′
j ) = g(Pi,P ′′
j ). If g(Pi,P ′′
j ) =
g(Pi,P ′′
j ), then the desired result is obtained by setting P
β
i equal to P ′′





i ) = w and, by Corollary 6, g(P
β
i ,P ′′




j ). So, suppose g(Pi,P ′′
j ) > g(Pi,P ′′
j ).
If b > g(Pi,P ′′
j ), then by choosing P
β
i equal to P ′′






j )) = g(Pi,P ′′
j )  = b, contradicting Corollary 4. Hence, g(Pi,P ′′
j ) =
m3(b,g(Pi,Pj),Xrg) ≥ b. Assume, by contradiction, g(Pi,P ′′
j ) > b. Then, g(Pi,P ′′
j ) =
g(Pi,Pj). Moreover, g(Pi,P j) = β, because g(Pi,P ′′
j ) = g(e Pi,P ′′
j ) and g(e Pi,P ′′
j ) = β.
Hence, β > b and g(Pi,P ′
j) = m3(a,g(Pi,Pj),Xrg) = m3(a,β,Xrg) = β. However, since
g(Pi,P ′
j) = m3(a,g(Pi,Pj),Xrg) is at most a, it follows that g(e Pi,P ′
j) = m3(c,β,g(Pi,P ′
j))
is either c or β, contradicting that by hypothesis g(e Pi,P ′
j) = α and α  = β and c  = α.
Therefore, it must be that g(Pi,P ′′
j ) = b, implying that g(e Pi,P ′′
j ) = m3(c,b,g(Pi,P ′′
j )) =
b. But, then the desired result is obtained by setting P
β
i equal to P ′′
j .
Now, to complete the analysis, we proceed as in the proof of Lemma 5. First, recall that
w  = α and w  = β, because w  ∈ rg. Otherwise, we would have had τ|rg(P ′
j) = τ|rg(P ′′
j ).
Moreover, by Corollary 5, w  = z, because z ∈ rg.
Case 1. Suppose β > w > α. If ˆ P ≻ P ′
j, then wP ′
j α implies w ˆ P α (recall ˆ P is
the common preference of the proﬁle ˆ P−{i,j}). Deﬁne the sequence of proﬁles P0
−{i,j} =
( ˆ P,..., ˆ P), P1
−{i,j} = (P α, ˆ P,..., ˆ P),...,P
n−2
−{i,j} = (P α,...,P α). For each k = 0,...,n − 2,
let xk = f(P α
i ,P ′
j,Pk
−{i,j}). By strategy-proofness, α = x0 ˆ P x1 ˆ P ..., ˆ P xn−2 = w. There-
fore, by transitivity, α ˆ P w, a contradiction.
In a similar way, if P ′
j ≻ ˆ P, then wP ′
j β implies w ˆ P β. Deﬁne the sequence of proﬁles
P0
−{i,j} = ( ˆ P,..., ˆ P), P1
−{i,j} = (P β, ˆ P,..., ˆ P),...,P
n−2
−{i,j} = (P β,...,P β). For each k =




−{i,j}). By strategy-proofness, β = y0 ˆ P y1 ˆ P ..., ˆ P yn−2 =
w. Therefore, β ˆ P w, a contradiction.
Case 2. Finally, suppose β > α > w. The remaining case, where w > β > α, is
similar. If P ′′
j ≻ ˆ P, then w ˆ P α and we can use the same type of argument than in Case 1.
Hence, assume ˆ P ≻ P ′′
j . By sp, β P ′′





must be a ¯ ¯ P−{i,j} ∈ SC
n−2 such that f(P α
i ,P ′
j, ¯ ¯ P−{i,j}) = β. Deﬁne the sequence of proﬁles
P0
−{i,j} = ( ˆ P,..., ˆ P), P1
−{i,j} = ( ¯ ¯ Pℓ1, ˆ P,..., ˆ P),...,P
n−2
−{i,j} = ( ¯ ¯ Pℓ1,..., ¯ ¯ Pℓn−2). For each k =
0,...,n−2, let xk = f(P α
i ,P ′
j,Pk
−{i,j}). By strategy-proofness, α = x0 ˆ P x1 ˆ P ... ˆ P xn−2 = β.




















j , ˆ P−{i,j}) = β. Consider a preference P ǫ ∈ P, between P ′′




















If P ǫ ∈ SC, we are done. By Lemma 4, f(P α
i ,P ′′
j ,Pǫ




Therefore, agent j manipulates f at (P α
i ,P ′′
j ,Pǫ
−{i,j}) via P ′
j. On the contrary, if P ǫ  ∈ SC,
then the desired contradiction is found following the same argument applied in Steps 2 to 4
in the second case of the proof of Lemma 5.
Hence, by Case 1 and 2, we conclude that O
f
i (P ′
j, ˆ P−{i,j}) = O
f
i (P ′′
j , ˆ P−{i,j}). Applying a
similar reasoning, we also have that O
f
i (P ′
j, ˇ P−{i,j}) = O
f
i (P ′′
j , ˇ P−{i,j}).
Step 2. Next we prove that O
f
i (P ′
j, ˆ P−{i,j}) = O
f
i (P ′′




j , ˇ P−{i,j}) = O
f
i (P ′
j, ˇ P−{i,j}). Hence, it is enough to show that O
f
i (P ′




j, ˇ P−{i,j}). Deﬁne the sequence of proﬁles
P
0
−{i,j} = ( ˆ P,..., ˆ P),
P
1





−{i,j} = ( ˇ P,..., ˇ P).
To show that O
f
i (P ′
j, ˆ P−{i,j}) = O
f
i (P ′
j, ˇ P−{i,j}), it is enough to prove that for all k =









−{i,j}). Suppose, by contradiction, there exists 1 ≤


















￿ ˇ P,..., ˇ P | {z }
k∗−1







￿ ˇ P,..., ˇ P, ˇ P | {z }
k∗




That is, proﬁles P
k∗−1
−{i,j} and Pk∗
−{i,j} diﬀer only in one preference relation. Abusing a bit














37However, (9) contradicts Step 1, because (P ′
j,P
k∗−1
−{i,j,k∗}) is equal to (P ′
j,Pk∗
−{i,j,k∗}), and
τ|rf( ˇ Pk∗) = τ|rf( ˆ Pk∗) = z. Therefore, O
f
i (P ′
j, ˆ P−{i,j}) = O
f
i (P ′′
j , ˇ P−{i,j}).
Step 3. Suppose that for some K ⊂ N\{i} and some P′
K, P′′
K ∈ SC
K with the property
that ∀j ∈ K, τ|rf(P ′










K, ˇ P ¯ K\{i}). (10)
Notice that Step 2 deals with the particular case where K = {j}. Fix any k ∈ ¯ K\{i}
and two preferences P ′
k, P ′′
k ∈ SC for which τ|rf(P ′
k) = τ|rf(P ′′









K∪{k}, ˇ P ¯ K\{i,k}). (11)
This is equivalent to prove that O
f
i (P′
K∪{k}, ˆ P ¯ K\{i,k}) = O
f
i (P′′
K∪{k}, ˆ P ¯ K\{i,k}). De-
ﬁne the (|K| + 2)-person social choice rule g : SC
|K|+2 → X, such that for all
(Pi,PK∪{k}) ∈ SC












K∪{k}, ˆ P ¯ K\{i,k}) = O
f
i (P′′
K∪{k}, ˆ P ¯ K\{i,k}). In partic-




















Step 4. Finally, suppose that for some S ⊂ N and some P′
¯ S,P′′
¯ S ∈ SC
|¯ S| with the property
that ∀j ∈ ¯ S, τ|rf(P ′
j) = τ|rf(P ′′
j ), we have O
f
S(P′
¯ S) = O
f
S(P′′




¯ S\{h}) = O
f
S∪{h}(P′′
¯ S\{h}). Suppose not. Without loss of generality, assume
there exists x ∈ X such that x ∈ O
f
S∪{h}(P′
¯ S\{h}) and x  ∈ O
f
S∪{h}(P′′
¯ S\{h}). Then, there must
be a e PS∪{h} ∈ SC
|S|+1 such that f(e PS∪{h},P′
¯ S\{h}) = x. Fix e PS ∈ SC
|S| and deﬁne the
|¯ S|-person social choice rule g : SC
|¯ S| → X such that for all P¯ S ∈ SC
|¯ S|, g(P¯ S) = f(e PS,P¯ S).
Since g is sp, the argument in Step 3 implies that O
g
h(P′
¯ S\{h}) = O
g
h(P′′




¯ S\{h}) = O
f
h(e PS,P′′
¯ S\{h}), implying that x ∈ O
f
h(e PS,P′′
¯ S\{h}). That is,
there is a b Ph ∈ SC such that f(b Ph, e PS,P′′
¯ S\{h}) = x. So, x ∈ O
f
S∪{h}(P′′
¯ S\{h}), a contradiction.
Thus, for all h ∈ ¯ S, O
f
S∪{h}(P′
¯ S\{h}) = O
f
S∪{h}(P′′
¯ S\{h}). And, since S ⊂ N and P ′,P ′′ ∈ SC
were arbitrarily chosen, this completes the proof. ￿
Now, we are ready to prove Proposition 2:





i ∈ SC such that τ|rf(P ′
i) = τ|rf(P ′′
i ), and f(P ′
i,P′
−i) = x  = y = f(P ′′
i ,P′
−i). Fix
j  = i. Since preferences are strict, x  = y implies that either xP ′
j y or y P ′
j x. Without loss
of generality, assume that y P ′




















−{i,j}). That is, there exists a b Pj ∈ SC such that f(b Pj,P ′
i,P′
−{i,j}) = y.
However, since y P ′
j x, this means that j would like to manipulate f at (P ′
i,P′
−i) via b Pj, a
contradiction. Therefore, f is to. ￿
7 Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1. (Suﬃciency) Immediate from Proposition 1 and the deﬁnition of
positional dictatorships.
(Necessity) Suppose f is un, an and sp on SC
n. We want to show that f ∈ PD. By
Proposition 2, f is to on SC
n.
Consider ﬁrst the case where |N| = 2. Fix a proﬁle P ∈ SC
n. Without loss of gen-
erality, assume τ(P2) ≥ τ(P1). By Lemma 1, f(P1,P2) = m3(τ(P1),f(P1,P2),f(P1,P2)),
where the lower (respectively, the upper) bar is used to denote the most leftist (respec-
tively, rightist) preference relation on X. Applying Lemma 1 once again, f(P1,P2) =
m3(τ(P2),f(P1,P2),f(P1,P2)), and f(P1,P2) = m3(τ(P2),f(P1,P2),f(P1,P2)). By una-
nimity, f(P1,P 2) = X and f(P1,P2) = X. By anonymity, f(P1,P 2) = f(P1,P2).
We show next that f(P1,P 2),f(P1,P2) ∈ {X,X}. Suppose not. Without loss of gen-
erality, assume that f(P1,P2) = z ∈ X\{X,X}. Consider a preference P α
1 ∈ P such that
(i) τ(P α
1 ) = τ(P 1), and (ii) X P α
1 z (see Figure 7). If P α
1 ∈ SC, we are done. By to,
f(P α
1 ,P2) = f(P1,P2) = z. Thus, by deﬁnition of P α
1 , individual 1 would like to manipulate
f at (P α
1 ,P2) via P 1.
On the contrary, if P α
1  ∈ SC, then using the order of the preferences, there must exist
a preference P
β
1 ∈ SC which blocks P α
1 . That is, there must be a P
β
1 ∈ SC such that (i)
τ(P
β
1 ) > τ(P 1), and (ii) z P
β
1 X (see Figure 7). Denote f(P
β
1 ,P2) = zβ. If z > zβ, then
individual 1 would manipulate f at (P1,P2) via P
β
1 . Similarly, if zβ = X, then 1 would
manipulate f at (P
β
1 ,P2) via P1. Therefore, X > zβ ≥ z. Consider a preference P
α+1
1 ∈ P
such that (i) τ(P
α+1
1 ) = τ(P
β
1 ), and (ii) X P
α+1
1 zβ (see Figure 7). If P
α+1
1 ∈ SC, we are
done. By to, f(P
α+1
1 ,P2) = zβ. Thus, by deﬁnition of P
α+1
1 , individual 1 would like to
manipulate f at (P
α+1
1 ,P2) via P1.
On the other hand, if P
α+1
1  ∈ SC, then we can repeat the previous argument and ﬁnd
a preference P
β+1
1 ∈ SC such that (i) τ(P
β+1
1 ) > τ(P
β
1 ), and (ii) zβ P
β+1
1 X. Since in each





1 ,... approaches P1. Therefore, at same point we will ﬁnd a preference P
β+ℓ
1 ∈ SC
such that (i) τ(P
β+ℓ
1 ) = τ(P 1), and (ii) zβ+ℓ−1 P
β+ℓ
1 X, which provides the desired contradic-
























Figure 7: Fixed ballots over X
If f(P1,P2) = f(P1,P2) = X, then f(P 1,P2) = m3(τ(P2),X,X) = X and f(P1,P2) =
m3(τ(P2),X,X) = τ(P2). Thus, f(P1,P2) = m3(τ(P1),X,τ(P2)) = τ(P1), (i.e., f chooses
the smallest peak). Instead, if f(P1,P2) = f(P1,P2) = X, then a similar argument shows
that f(P1,P2) = m3(τ(P1),τ(P2),X) = τ(P2), (i.e., f chooses the largest peak).
Thus, if |N| = 2 and f satisﬁes the hypotheses of Theorem 1, i.e. f is un, an and sp,
the previous paragraphs show that there exists a parameter (or ﬁxed ballot) α ∈ {X,X}
such that, for all P ∈ SC
n, f(P) = m3(τ(P1),τ(P2), α). Hence, f ∈ PD.
Now, suppose |N| = 3. Take any proﬁle P ∈ SC
n. Without loss of generality, relabel N


















where a3 = f(P1,P2,P3), a0 = f(P1,P2,P3), and
a2 = f(P1,P2,P3) = f(P1,P2,P3) = f(P1,P2,P 3), (13)
and
a1 = f(P1,P2,P3) = f(P1,P2,P3) = f(P1,P2,P 3), (14)
where the equalities in (13) and in (14), respectively, follow from the fact that f is an on
SC
n. By un and tm, we have that X = a0 ≥ a1 ≥ a2 ≥ a3 = X. By sp, a1, a2 ∈ {X,X}.
40Otherwise, if for example f(P1,P2,P3)  ∈ {X,X}, we can ﬁnd a preference P α
1 ∈ SC such
that, for some P
β
1 ∈ SC, τ(P α
1 ) = τ(P
β
1 ) and X P α
1 f(P
β




1 ,P2,P3). Thus, agent 1 can manipulate f at (P α
1 ,P2,P3) via P 1.
There are three cases to consider:
(i) If a1 = X, then a2 = X because a1 ≥ a2. Therefore, (12) can be rewritten as
f(P) = m3(τ(P1),X,τ(P2)) = τ(P1), (i.e., f chooses the smallest ideal point);
(ii) Similarly, if a2 = X, then a1 = X, and f(P) = m3(τ(P1),τ(P3),X) = τ(P3), (i.e., f
chooses the largest ideal point);
(iii) Finally, if a1 = X and a2 = X, then (12) can be rewritten as f(P) =
m3(τ(P1),τ(P2),τ(P3)) = τ(P2), (i.e., f selects the median ideal point).
Thus, since P was arbitrarily chosen, (i)-(iii) imply that, if |N| = 3 and f is an,
un and sp, then there exist α1,α2 ∈ {X,X} such that for all P ∈ SC
n, f(P) =
m5(τ(P1),τ(P2),τ(P3),α1,α2). Therefore, f ∈ PD.
Now let us extend the proof to |N| = n > 3. For all K ⊆ N, let a|K| = f(PK,P ¯ K), where
¯ K = N\K. By unanimity, K = ∅ implies a0 = f(P1,...,P n) = X. Similarly, if K = N,
then an = f(P1,...,Pn) = X. By anonymity,
a1 = f(Pi,P−i), ∀{i} ⊂ N,
a2 = f(P{i,j},P−{i,j}), ∀{i,j} ⊆ N,
. . .
. . .
an−1 = f(P−j,Pj), ∀{j} ⊂ N.
Thus, by top-monotonicity, a0 ≥ a1 ≥ a2 ≥ ... ≥ an−1 ≥ an. Moreover, for all k =
0,1,...,n, ak ∈ {X,X}. In eﬀect, if either k = 0 or k = n, then the result follows
immediately from un. So, assume that ak ∈ {X,X} for some k = 0,1,...,n − 2, and let us
prove the claim for ak+1. On the contrary, suppose ak+1 = f(P1,...,P k+1,P k+2,...,Pn)  ∈
{X,X}. Without loss of generality, let ak = f(P1,...,Pk,Pk+1,...,Pn) = X. Following
the argument illustrated in Figure 7 for |N| = 2, we can ﬁnd preferences P α
k+1 ∈ SC and
P
β
k+1 ∈ SC such that τ(P α
k+1) = τ(P
β





k+1,Pk+2,...,Pn) = f(P 1,...,Pk,P
β
k+1,Pk+2,...,Pn). Hence, agent
k + 1 can manipulate f at (P 1,...,Pk,P α
k+1,Pk+2,...,Pn) via P k+1, a contradiction.
Now, ﬁx any proﬁle P ∈ SC
n, and relabel N if necessary, so that τ(Pn) ≥ τ(Pn−1) ≥
... ≥ τ(P1). By repeated application of Lemma 1, it follows that:
(i) If ak = X for all k = 1,...,n − 1, then f(P) = m3(τ(P1),X,τ(P2)) = τ(P1), (i.e., f
chooses the smallest peak);
41(ii) If ak = X for all k = 1,...,n − 1, then f(P) = m3(τ(P1),τ(Pn),X) = τ(Pn), (i.e., f
chooses the largest peak);
(iii) Finally, if for some k = 1,...,n − 2, a1 =     = ak = X and ak+1 =     = an−1 = X,
then f(P) = m3(τ(P1),τ(Pk+1),τ(Pk+2)) = τ(Pk+1), (i.e., if k parameters are placed at
X and the rest at X, then f chooses the ideal point ranked at the (k+1)-th position).
Therefore, since P ∈ SC
n was arbitrarily chosen and, for every k = 0,1...,n, ak
is independent of P, if f is an, un and sp, then items (i)-(iii) imply that there ex-
ist n − 1 ﬁxed ballots α1,α2,...,αn−1 on {X,X} such that, for all P ∈ SC
n, f(P) =
m2n−1(τ(P1),τ(P2),...,τ(Pn),α1,...,αn−1). Hence, f ∈ PD. ￿
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